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Abstract
This article considers what limits the constitution places on holding someone criminally liable for another's
conduct. While vicarious criminal liability is often criticized, there is no doubt that it is constitutionally
permissible as a general matter. Under the long-standing felony murder doctrine, for example, if A and B rob a
bank and B shoots and kills a security guard, A can be held criminally liable for the murder. What if, however,
A was not involved in the robbery but instead had a completely separate conspiracy with B to distribute
cocaine? What relationship, if any, does the constitution require between A's conduct and B's crimes in order
to hold A liable for them? It is clear A could not be punished for B's crimes simply because they are friends.
This is true even if A suspected B was involved in criminal activity. Beyond this, however, the boundaries are
surprisingly uncertain. Though commentators have long debated the wisdom of vicarious criminal liability as
a policy matter, the question of whether the constitution constrains the government's ability to punish one
person for another's crimes has gone largely unexamined. The lack of attention to this topic is all the more
glaring in light of a small but steady line of cases holding that, in the context of conspiracy law, due process
forbids vicarious liability for crimes that are not both (a) reasonably foreseeable and (b) done in furtherance
of the conspiracy (these are the so-called "Pinkerton limits"). Despite these cases, however, courts continue to
permit holding defendants strictly liable for another's conduct in other areas of criminal law, such as felony
murder. If negligence is constitutionally required for vicarious liability in a conspiracy why is it not for felony
murder vicarious liability? This article aims to examine the extent to which substantive due process limits
vicarious criminal liability through the lens of cases that have held Pinkerton's test to be a constitutional
minimum in the conspiracy context. First, I consider why courts have treated the Pinkerton test as a
constitutional floor and attempt to build a more coherent approach for understanding these cases based on
the due process "personal guilt" concept. Second, I explore how these cases might impact other areas of
criminal law using three examples: the definition of "scope" in conspiracy law, the felony murder doctrine, and
the "material support" provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Though a clear and
thorough account of personal guilt and vicarious liability under the constitution is likely to remain elusive for
some time, I hope that this article will help start a broader and much-needed discussion about constitutional
constraints on vicarious criminal liability.
Keywords
Conspiracy, Pinkerton, Vicarious Liability, Felony murder, Criminal law, Constitutional law, Substantive due
process, Due process
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INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after deciding that the tranquil life of the academy just isn’t 
satisfying my inner need for risk and adventure, I call up my friend 
Dave and convince him to rob a bank with me.  Since I came up with 
the idea, I tell Dave that it is only fair he do all the legwork to prepare 
for the robbery.  To my pleasant surprise, he agrees and quickly 
begins to make the necessary arrangements, leaving me free to relax 
and catch up on my blog reading, ignorant of what exactly it is that 
he is doing.  In the course of his preparations, Dave commits some 
                                                          
 * Visiting Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  I would like to 
thank Laura Berg, Robert M. Chesney, Greg David, Deven Desai, Anders Kaye, Linda 
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Templin, Kaimi Wenger, Claire Wright, and all the participants in the Thomas 
Jefferson School of Law Junior Faculty Writing Workshop.  None should be held 
vicariously liable for any errors, which are, of course, mine alone. 
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additional crimes:  he steals a vintage Buick to use as our getaway car, 
buys a few weapons on the black market, and, while he is purchasing 
the weapons, decides to get some marijuana for his personal use.  A 
couple of nights before the robbery, Dave goes to a bar and foolishly 
tells the bartender about our plan.  The bartender tells the police 
and they bust us before we’re able to rob the bank.  As a result, I’m 
on the hook for conspiracy to rob the bank, and, vicariously, for the 
car theft and the weapons, but not for the marijuana.  This is 
because, under the rule famously announced in Pinkerton v. United 
States,1 a conspirator is liable for any crimes committed by his co-
conspirators that were both reasonably foreseeable and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, and Dave’s marijuana purchase was 
neither.  Indeed, even if I knew with certainty that Dave was going to 
buy the marijuana, I could not be held vicariously liable for it, since 
his marijuana purchase didn’t further the conspiracy.2 
Though critics consistently deride Pinkerton as overly broad, its 
restrictions on vicarious liability seem almost robust compared to 
some other areas of criminal law.  Under the felony murder rule, for 
example, if Dave and I had been working as a pick-pocketing team 
and he unexpectedly went berserk and stabbed and killed one of our 
targets, I could be convicted of murder even if the killing was not 
reasonably foreseeable.3  What accounts for this distinction?  What, if 
anything, prevents the government from holding conspirators 
vicariously liable for all crimes committed by their partners, 
regardless of whether the crimes further the conspiracy or are 
foreseeable?  To put the question more directly:  are Pinkerton’s 
limitations on vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators 
constitutionally mandated and, if so, why don’t they seem to apply to 
other areas of criminal law? 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the answer to whether the 
Constitution requires Pinkerton’s limits seems to be yes.  Dating back 
to the mid-1970s, every court to consider the issue has held or 
strongly implied that the Pinkerton rule is indeed constitutionally 
                                                          
 1. 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
 2. See United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that 
“knowledge of another [conspiracy] participant’s criminal acts is not enough to hold 
the defendant responsible for those acts”). 
 3. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
59, 97–98 (2004) (discussing a felony murder case from 1786 where a young member 
of a pick-pocketing ring was held vicariously liable for another member’s murder).  
But see id. at 98 (noting that such broad liability was the exception at common law 
and arguing that common law felony murder was, in general, significantly more 
constrained than is commonly believed). 
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derived.4  A number have even indicated that substantive due process 
goes further by limiting vicarious liability for defendants who played 
only a small role in the conspiracy even if the Pinkerton requirements 
have been met.5  To be sure, courts have found constitutional 
violations in only a few cases6 and the Supreme Court has never 
addressed the issue, but the notion that Pinkerton’s rule is required by 
substantive due process appears to be a relatively uncontroversial 
proposition among federal circuit and district courts.7  Despite 
agreement on this basic proposition, however, courts have failed to 
provide much in the way of analysis or explanation as to why and in 
what way Pinkerton is grounded in substantive due process.  Many 
decisions provide only a paragraph or two of analysis to support their 
assertion that the Pinkerton rule is constitutionally based.8  Of the 
courts that have considered the issue in greater depth, none have 
outlined a clear method for applying Pinkerton as a decision of 
constitutional law. 
Scholars, meanwhile, have overlooked the courts’ treatment of 
Pinkerton as constitutional law almost entirely.  Indeed, for one of the 
most famous cases in all of criminal law, Pinkerton is surprisingly 
under-examined in general.9  Of the handful of major articles written 
                                                          
 4. See United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F.3d 163, 196 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(discussing cases addressing the constitutional basis of Pinkerton); infra Part III 
(analyzing courts’ treatment of Pinkerton as constitutionally required). 
 5. See United States v. Alverez, 755 F.2d 830, 850 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e are 
mindful of the potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine in cases 
involving attenuated relationships between the conspirator and the substantive 
crime.”); see also id. at 850 n.25 (“In our view, the liability of such ‘minor’ participants 
must rest on a more substantial foundation than the mere whim of the prosecutor.”); 
Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation:  A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy 
Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 124–33, 147–52 (2006) (discussing cases and arguing 
that substantive due process should preclude Pinkerton liability for defendants who 
played a minor or attenuated role in the conspiracy). 
 6. See United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing 
conviction for knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon based on vicarious liability 
because it was “an unwarranted, and possibly unconstitutional, expansion of the 
Pinkerton doctrine”); United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“Assuming, under Pinkerton, that responsibility for both the predicate offense prong 
and use of a weapon prong of section 924(c) may be established on the basis of 
foreseeability alone, in Leticia’s case, foreseeability has been stretched beyond the 
limits of due process.”). 
 7. See infra Part III (discussing courts’ treatment of Pinkerton limits as 
constitutionally mandated). 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting 
“the due process limitations inherent in Pinkerton” without discussion of these 
limitations). 
 9. A Lexis Shepard’s report reveals only 193 law review articles that have cited 
Pinkerton since 1980.  By way of comparison, the equally famous Commerce Clause 
case Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) decided four years before Pinkerton, has 
been cited in 1699 law review articles during that same period according to Shepard’s.  
Similarly, a Lexis search for “atleast10(Pinkerton)” yields only fifty law review articles, 
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on conspiracy law since Pinkerton was decided, none has had Pinkerton 
as its primary topic and only two have given the case detailed 
treatment.10  Most of the commentary that has focused on Pinkerton 
has been aimed at critiquing or, less commonly, defending the 
soundness of holding defendants vicariously liable for the acts of 
their co-conspirators.11  In a recent and notable exception, one 
commentator relied on cases holding Pinkerton to be constitutionally 
required to argue in favor of a due process-based rule that would 
restrict vicarious liability for conspirators who are “attenuated” from 
the conspiracy.12  However, the underlying questions of why 
Pinkerton’s “reasonably foreseeable” and “in furtherance of” formula 
may be constitutionally required and what cases that have adopted 
this position might mean for other areas of criminal law remain 
essentially unexamined by scholars.13  Thus, although the courts that 
                                                          
a number of which are unrelated to the conspiracy case.  Indeed, scholarship on the 
law of conspiracy generally has been sparse.  See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 
112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1311 (2003) (noting the lack of scholarship on criminal 
conspiracy law). 
 10. In his significant article on conspiracy in 2003, Neal Katyal posited that only 
two major articles on conspiracy had been written since 1959.  See id. at 1311 n.8 
(citing Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 
(1959); Philip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137 
(1973)).  None of these articles discuss Pinkerton in any detail.  To Katyal’s list of 
major articles, one might add the influential 1959 Harvard Law Review Note on 
conspiracy and Paul Robinson’s 1984 article Imputed Criminal Liability, both of which 
address Pinkerton in some detail but do not focus on the case.  See Developments in the 
Law:  Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 993–1000 (1959) [hereinafter 
Criminal Conspiracy] (analyzing and critiquing Pinkerton); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed 
Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984) (discussing different theories that may 
justify imputed liability and applying them to various doctrines including Pinkerton). 
 11. See, e.g., Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 998 (“No court which has taken 
the Pinkerton approach has offered an adequate rationale for convicting a conspirator 
for the crimes of his associates.”); Katyal, supra note 9, at 1372–75 (providing a 
functional defense of Pinkerton but acknowledging that other considerations such as 
unfair discrimination “may very well be a reason to reject Pinkerton or to take other 
mitigating steps”); Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law:  Time to Turn Back from an 
Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 7 (1992) 
(criticizing Pinkerton liability because it “permits the government to hold a defendant 
criminally responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators regardless 
of actual knowledge, intent, or participation”) (citation omitted); Matthew A. Pauley, 
The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 42 (arguing that Pinkerton is not 
an “aberration” but rather “is fundamentally consistent with American law in many 
ways”). 
 12. See Noferi, supra note 5, at 147–54 (arguing for limiting Pinkerton liability on 
the basis of “attenuation”). 
 13. Though Mark Noferi provides a thorough and helpful history of cases 
discussing Pinkerton and substantive due process, he does not analyze the 
constitutional dimensions of Pinkerton itself or the implications for other areas of 
criminal law.  See id. at 140–41 (arguing that “cases equating ‘foreseeability’ with ‘due 
process’ appear misleading” to his task of exploring limits on Pinkerton itself because 
they provide “little more than a restatement of Pinkerton’s ‘foreseeability’ test”).  
Instead Noferi focuses his analysis exclusively on whether the cases support a new 
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have addressed the issue are in general agreement that Pinkerton’s 
limitations on vicarious liability are constitutionally based, there is 
still no framework for analyzing due process issues in vicarious 
liability cases, little understanding of the reasons for treating the 
Pinkerton limits as constitutionally mandated, or even an active 
discussion about these important questions.  As Judge Nancy Gertner 
recently put it:  “In short, the law has not yet developed clear and 
cogent standards to assess the outer due process limits of Pinkerton.”14 
The lack of attention paid to the ascendance of Pinkerton as a 
constitutionally based decision among federal courts is all the more 
surprising given that its rule is now one of the few that appears to 
place constitutional restrictions on the government’s ability to define 
crimes.15  No court or commentator has addressed how the 
recognition of Pinkerton’s limits as constitutionally required might 
impact other areas of substantive criminal law.  If Pinkerton’s 
limitations on vicarious liability—modest though they may be16—are a 
constitutional floor, however, the potential impact may be significant.  
The “reasonably foreseeable” requirement, for instance, imposes a 
minimum mens rea of negligence for vicarious liability stemming 
from a conspiracy, but the Supreme Court has “affirmed and 
reaffirmed that strict liability as a general matter is constitutional.”17  
Indeed, as noted above, a defendant can be convicted of felony 
murder based on a killing committed by her co-felon even if the 
killing was accidental and not reasonably foreseeable.18  If negligence 
                                                          
attenuation limit on Pinkerton for defendants who play a minor role in a conspiracy 
and what such a limitation might look like.  Id. at 147–52. 
 14. United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67–68 n.3 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 15. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1997) (“Constitutionally speaking, substantive 
criminal law is almost entirely unregulated.”). 
 16. Indeed, discussing Pinkerton as a rule limiting vicarious liability may seem 
somewhat ironic given that the decision itself represented a significant expansion on 
vicarious liability when it was issued.  See infra Part I (discussing the creation of 
Pinkerton liability).  Nevertheless, the phrase “Pinkerton limits” is helpful and 
appropriate in this context as this Article examines whether the Pinkerton rule could 
be constitutionally reduced (or eliminated) or whether it sets minimum 
requirements for vicarious liability under the Due Process Clause. 
 17. Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 832 (1999); 
see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (noting that, 
though strict liability is disfavored, it “[does] not invariably offend constitutional 
requirements”). 
 18. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 557 (4th ed. 2006) 
(“[T]he felony murder rule authorizes strict liability for a death that results from 
commission of a felony.”); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony Murder 
Rule:  A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 
1438 (1994) (“The broadest version of the doctrine makes even an accidental 
killing—one caused by nonnegligent conduct—murder.”).  Under the law in most 
states, so long as the killing is committed in furtherance of a group of felonies set by 
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is constitutionally required for vicarious liability in a conspiracy why is 
it not for felony murder vicarious liability? 
Viewing Pinkerton’s test as a constitutional minimum also raises 
questions within conspiracy law itself about the current approach to 
defining the “scope” of a conspiratorial agreement.  In this area, 
courts continue to follow an approach developed before the rise of 
Pinkerton liability, which analyzes the scope of a conspiracy from an 
evidentiary perspective and limits it only where a mass trial might 
unfairly influence the jury.  As a result, a defendant can be convicted 
of being part of a large conspiracy, even if he is unaware of its 
breadth or details, so long as he knows the essential nature of the 
group’s plan.  When this ex-post definition of a conspiracy’s scope is 
used to expand a defendant’s substantive liability, it can result in 
strict liability for crimes that were not foreseeable to her or done in 
furtherance of her agreement. 
To take another example, one particularly controversial provision 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 
which has gained prominence for making it a crime to provide 
“material support” to a “foreign terrorist organization,” seems to do 
away with both of Pinkerton’s requirements by mandating added 
criminal liability “if the death of any person results” from the material 
support.19  Litigants and commentators have argued that the 
provision is unconstitutional because it criminalizes support of 
foreign organizations that engage in peaceful and legitimate 
endeavors (such as providing humanitarian aid), thereby infringing 
on rights under both the First Amendment and the Due Process 
Clause.20  The Pinkerton limits may provide new insight into the 
questions about AEDPA’s “material support” provision that could 
                                                          
the legislature, it constitutes felony murder. See Tomkovicz, supra, at 1434 (noting 
that most American jurisdictions have adopted this approach to felony murder).  But 
see generally Binder, supra note 3 (arguing such broad felony murder liability was, by 
far, the exception at common law). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000).  In full, the provision reads: 
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of 
any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 
Id. 
 20. See, e.g., David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd:  Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the 
Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 205 (noting that the U.S. government 
defends AEDPA on the grounds that restrictions on financial contributions to a 
political group is not direct association, subject to strict scrutiny, but is a regulation 
of conduct that only incidentally affects the right to association). 
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help to reduce some of the confusion among the courts that have 
considered its constitutionality.21 
This Article aims to examine the extent to which substantive due 
process limits vicarious criminal liability through the lens of cases that 
have held Pinkerton’s test to be a constitutional minimum in the 
conspiracy context.  The Article does not directly address how the 
prevailing methods for analyzing fundamental rights questions would 
treat vicarious criminal liability,22 whether the Pinkerton rule is 
desirable as a matter of policy or criminal theory, or whether the 
Constitution might place limits on vicarious liability for the acts of co-
conspirators beyond those in Pinkerton.  Rather, my goals here are, 
first, to examine why courts consider the Pinkerton test to be a 
constitutional floor and build a more coherent approach for 
understanding Pinkerton’s limits as constitutional requirements on 
vicarious liability; and, second, to explore how this more detailed 
account of “the due process limitations inherent in Pinkerton”23 might 
impact other areas of criminal law.  In so doing, I hope also to spark a 
broader conversation about the extent to which the concept of 
personal guilt under the Due Process Clause might constrain 
substantive criminal law. 
Part I of this Article examines the Pinkerton decision and the rise of 
its two-pronged test in state and federal courts.  Part II provides a 
history of the decisions that have found Pinkerton’s test to be a 
constitutionally required limit on vicarious liability for the acts of co-
conspirators.  Part III takes a closer look at the constitutional 
dimensions of Pinkerton by drawing upon the “personal guilt” due 
process concept that the Supreme Court has recognized in the 
context of another area of vicarious criminal liability.  In the process, 
this Part will seek to develop a clearer framework for understanding 
and applying the Pinkerton test as a rule of constitutional law.  Part IV 
discusses some of the areas of substantive criminal law that might be 
affected by the account of Pinkerton as constitutional law advanced in 
Part III.  The examination in Part IV is not meant to be exhaustive, 
                                                          
 21. See infra Part IV.C (examining AEDPA as another area of criminal law to 
which vicarious liability applies). 
 22. For example, this Article does not thoroughly analyze whether Pinkerton’s 
“formula [rises] to the level of [a] fundamental principle, so as to limit the 
traditional recognition of a State’s capacity to define crimes and offenses.”  Clark v. 
Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2719 (2006); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 
(1996) (plurality opinion) (noting that a state’s ability to carry out and define crimes 
“is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it offends some 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 23. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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but instead provides a window into some of the issues that courts’ 
treatment of the “reasonably foreseeable” and “in furtherance of” 
requirements as constitutionally required raises.  To that end, this 
Part provides an overview of the potential implications of Pinkerton’s 
limits in three distinct areas:  (1) the definition of the “scope” of an 
unlawful agreement in a conspiracy; (2) felony murder vicarious 
liability; and (3) AEDPA’s “material support” provision.  Part V 
concludes that recognition of Pinkerton’s limits as constitutionally 
required poses difficult challenges for broad applications of vicarious 
liability in other areas of criminal law.  These issues deserve greater 
attention than they have received.  In particular, courts that have 
held Pinkerton to be based in substantive due process should work in 
future cases toward creating a clear framework that would allow the 
principles guiding this rule to be consistently applied across cases. 
I. THE STRANGE RISE OF “PINKERTON LIABILITY” 
Pinkerton v. United States24 is one of the most well known cases in 
criminal law today.  As anyone who has taken criminal law will recall, 
under Pinkerton a defendant may be held liable for any crimes 
committed by her co-conspirators that were (1) reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant and (2) done in furtherance of the 
illegal agreement.25  Indeed, the case is so famously linked to this rule 
that most courts refer to vicarious liability for the acts of co-
conspirators as “Pinkerton liability.”26  It is surprising, then, that the 
Pinkerton opinion itself seemed to recite the rule almost as an after 
thought. 
Brothers Walter and Daniel Pinkerton lived two hundred yards 
from each other on Daniel’s farm, where they were engaged in an 
ongoing illegal whiskey business that had resulted in each being 
convicted “many times” of violating state liquor laws.27  Both brothers 
were charged and convicted of conspiracy to violate the tax code, as 
well as a number of substantive counts of tax evasion.28  There was, 
however, “no evidence to show that Daniel participated directly in the 
                                                          
 24. 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
 25. Id. at 647–48. 
 26. See United States v. Radermacher, 474 F.3d 999, 1002–03 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing Pinkerton liability); State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147, 1148 
(Ariz. 1992) (“The liability of an accused for acts committed by co-conspirators is 
often called ‘Pinkerton’ liability, after the case in which the United States Supreme 
Court recognized the doctrine as part of federal criminal law and upheld it against a 
double jeopardy challenge.”). 
 27. Pinkerton v. United States, 151 F.2d 499, 500 (1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 640 
(1946). 
 28. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641. 
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commission of the substantive offenses”29 or even knew of their 
commission—the substantive offenses had been committed by Walter 
alone. 
Daniel challenged his convictions for the substantive offenses by 
relying on a 1940 case from the Third Circuit, which held that a 
defendant could be convicted of a crime committed by her co-
conspirator only if she had directly participated in or aided and 
abetted it.30  The Third Circuit reasoned that holding a conspirator 
liable for all crimes committed during the course of the conspiracy, 
as the government urged, was not authorized by the federal criminal 
code’s provision on aiding and abetting liability.  Under that statute, 
“[w]hoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined 
in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces, or procures its commission, is a principal.”31 
Justice Douglas, writing for the Pinkerton majority, rejected Daniel’s 
argument in a short two-paragraph discussion.32  Douglas based his 
analysis almost entirely on the rule that, in a criminal conspiracy, “an 
overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new 
agreement specifically directed to that act.”33  According to the overt 
act rule, established before Pinkerton, Conspirator A’s act can be used 
to satisfy the overt act element of a conspiracy charge against 
Conspirator B (the other element, of course, is that the defendant 
intentionally entered into the criminal agreement).34  “The governing 
principle is the same,” Douglas reasoned, “when the substantive 
offense is committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the 
unlawful project.”35  He concluded that, “[i]f [the overt act element] 
can be supplied by the act of one conspirator, we fail to see why the 
                                                          
 29. Id. at 645. 
 30. See United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745, 747–48 (3d Cir. 1940) (holding that 
the federal statute provides for criminal liability as a principal of a substantive offense 
only for those who directly commit the crime or aid or abet it). 
 31. Id. at 747 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 550 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000))); 
see also id. (“It was not sufficient merely to prove that he was a member of the 
conspiracy . . . and that in the course of that conspiracy those particular crimes were 
committed by other conspirators.”). 
 32. 328 U.S. at 646–48. 
 33. Id. at 646–47 (citation omitted).  The Court also analogized its decision to 
aiding and abetting liability, though did not base its decision on this theory as Daniel 
had not been charged as an aider or abettor.  Id. 
 34. Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 946.  At common law, the agreement 
itself was all that was required for a conspiracy conviction.  The overt act requirement 
was introduced into the federal statute without explanation, possibly due to a 
mistaken legislative interpretation of what was necessary to prove conspiracy at 
common law. Id. at 945–47; see also United States v. Goodling, 25 U.S. 460, 469 (1827) 
(“[T]he act of one conspirator . . . is considered the act of all, and is evidence against 
all.”). 
 35. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647. 
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same or other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not 
attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them 
responsible for the substantive offense.”36  Accordingly, the Court 
upheld Daniel’s convictions for Walter’s crimes. 
In the next and final paragraph of the opinion, Douglas delivered 
the passage that forms the basis for Pinkerton’s famous test, noting, 
without elaboration, that 
[a] different case would arise if the substantive offense committed 
by one of the conspirators was not in fact done in furtherance of 
the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful 
project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which 
could not be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural 
consequence of the unlawful agreement.37 
As discussed below, Pinkerton’s final paragraph later evolved into 
the now widely followed two-part test.  But, upon a close reading of 
the decision it is far from clear that the Court intended to embrace 
the broad “Pinkerton liability” that exists today.  Specifically, today’s 
two-part test seems to ignore the Court’s admonition regarding 
vicarious liability for substantive offenses that do “not fall within the 
scope of the unlawful project.”38  This is significant because, in 
Pinkerton, the substantive crimes and the goal of the scope of the 
conspiracy were one in the same.  The Pinkertons were convicted of 
conspiracy to violate various provisions of the tax code and the 
substantive crimes were instances where Walter “did unlawfully 
remove, deposit and conceal . . . a large quantity of distilled spirits . . . 
whereof a tax was then and there imposed by the laws of the United 
States, with intent then and there to defraud the United States of 
such tax.”39  In other words, the relationship between the scope of the 
conspiracy and the substantive offenses in Pinkerton was as close as it 
could be.  As Justice Douglas explained:  “The unlawful agreement 
contemplated precisely what was done.  It was formed for the purpose.  
                                                          
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 647–48. 
 38. Id.  This limit or “element” was not universally overlooked and was noted by 
one court as late as 1978, but is now generally omitted from the Pinkerton charge used 
in federal courts. 
There are, of course, cases which fall within the exceptions in Pinkerton 
where (1) the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators was 
not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, (2) did not fall within the 
scope of the unlawful project, or (3) was merely a part of the ramifications of 
the plan which could not reasonably have been foreseen as a necessary or 
natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. 
United States v. Molina, 581 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 39. Pinkerton v. United States, 151 F.2d 499, 500 (1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 640 
(1946). 
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The act done was in execution of the enterprise.”40  Accordingly, it is 
far from clear that the Pinkerton majority believed it was authorizing 
vicarious liability for crimes that were not also the actual objective of 
the illegal agreement.41 
Whatever the majority’s intentions, however, Justice Rutledge 
recognized the potentially sweeping nature of its holding.  In a 
dissent joined “in substance” by Justice Frankfurter,42 he sharply 
criticized the majority’s opinion as “a dangerous precedent”43 that 
appeared to pave the way for an “almost unlimited scope of vicarious 
responsibility for others’ acts which follows once agreement is 
shown.”44  Rutledge, following the Third Circuit’s analysis, argued 
that such a broad approach was inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme adopted by Congress because it permitted Daniel to be 
convicted for “substantive crimes committed only by Walter” without 
any “evidence that he counseled, advised or had knowledge of those 
particular acts or offenses.”45  In addition to statutory-based criticisms, 
Rutledge argued that the majority’s approach to vicarious liability 
may be unconstitutional, stating that, “[i]f it does not violate the 
letter of constitutional right, it fractures the spirit.”46 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, Justice Rutledge’s reasoning 
appears to be far more persuasive than the majority’s.  Indeed, the 
majority did not identify any statutory basis at all for holding 
defendants liable for the substantive crimes of their co-conspirators 
in the absence of proof of aiding and abetting.  Nor did the Court 
explain its reasons for rejecting Justice Rutledge’s and the Third 
Circuit’s analysis of the federal aiding and abetting statute, which was 
the only general provision of the criminal code defining vicarious 
                                                          
 40. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added); see also id. (“The rule which 
holds responsible one who counsels, procures, or commands another to commit a 
crime is founded on the same principle.”).  Justice Douglas indicated another 
possible limitation on conspiracy liability earlier in the opinion while discussing the 
Pinkerton brothers’ separate merger argument.  There, he sympathetically quoted a 
report by the Conference of Senior Judges that concluded that “the theory which 
permits us to call the aborted plan a greater offense than the completed crime 
supposes a serious and substantially continued group scheme for cooperative law 
breaking.”  Id. at 644 n.4. 
 41. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949) (describing 
Pinkerton as “narrow in scope” and applicable only “where the conspiracy was one to 
commit offenses of the character described in the substantive counts”). 
 42. Id. at 654 (Frankfurter, J., substantially concurring in Justice Rutledge’s 
dissent). 
 43. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part). 
 44. Id. at 650. 
 45. Id. at 651. 
 46. Id. at 650. 
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liability.47  That statute, still in effect today, defines the instances in 
which a person can be convicted as a principal for violating the 
federal criminal code and does not include anything akin to Pinkerton 
liability.48  Instead, it limits liability as a principal of a crime to a 
person who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its 
commission . . . .”49  Thus, the Pinkerton majority appears to have 
created an entirely new basis for criminal liability out of statutory thin 
air, arguably in violation of the prohibition against creation of federal 
common law crimes.50  To this day, the Pinkerton “elements” are 
nowhere to be found in the federal criminal code,51 though they have 
been incorporated into provisions of the (now discretionary)52 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.53  By contrast, the federal conspiracy 
statute specifies that the overt act requirement is satisfied where “one 
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
                                                          
 47. See Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 994 (noting that the majority did not 
identify the statutory basis for its holding). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United 
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal.”); id. § 2(b) (“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done 
which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the 
United States, is punishable as a principal.”). 
 49. Id. § 2(a). 
 50. The lack of a statutory basis for the Court’s reasoning has been largely 
unexamined by commentators.  The one exception is a recent insightful Comment 
by Michael Manning, which argues that Pinkerton impermissibly created a federal 
crime without any statutory basis.  Michael Manning, Comment, A Common Law Crime 
Analysis of Pinkerton v. United States:  Sixty Years of Impermissible Judicially-Created 
Criminal Liability, 67 MONT. L. REV. 89 (2006); cf. United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 
1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The Pinkerton doctrine is a judicially-created rule that 
makes a conspirator criminally liable for the substantive offenses committed by a co-
conspirator when they are reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of 
the conspiracy.”) (emphasis added). 
 51. Interestingly, at least one version of the Federal Criminal Code that was 
proposed in the 1970s and 1980s sought to add Pinkerton elements to the federal 
code.  See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1146 (noting that early drafts of the Code 
rejected Pinkerton but later drafts added the “reasonably foreseeable” and “in 
furtherance of” Pinkerton elements).  But, the Code was never passed.  See John S. 
Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal 
Crimes, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 545, 551 n.31 (“The proposal for a new Federal Criminal 
Code was introduced in the 93rd Congress, and the effort to enact such legislation 
lasted for about a dozen years.”). 
 52. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260 (2005). 
 53. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2006) (noting that 
a defendant “is accountable for the conduct . . . of others that was both:  (i) in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (ii) reasonably 
foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity”); see also United States v. 
Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the sentencing guidelines’ 
relevant conduct standard).  But see William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant 
Conduct:  The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 510 
(1990) (noting that the sentencing rule may be somewhat more constrained than 
Pinkerton liability). 
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conspiracy,”54 further undercutting the soundness of the majority’s 
reasoning that substantive vicarious liability was warranted as an 
extension of the overt act rule.55 
In the years following Pinkerton, the decision was “almost universally 
condemned by the academic community.”56  And, although no 
statistics exist, Pinkerton liability appears to have been “rarely utilized 
until the 1970’s.”57  Indeed, in 1962 the drafters of the Modal Penal 
Code rejected Pinkerton liability58 and by 1972, LaFave and Scott’s 
influential Handbook on Criminal Law declared that the Pinkerton rule 
had “never gained broad acceptance.”59  One factor that may have 
                                                          
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). 
 55. For a policy-based argument against the Court’s analogy between an overt act 
and substantive crime, see Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 998.  The most 
plausible statutory justification for the Pinkerton majority’s holding is that it impliedly 
determined “that ‘aiding and abetting’ and ‘conspiring’ are, and are intended by 
Congress to be, the same thing, differing only in the form of the descriptive words.”  
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 651 n.4 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see 
also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 451 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“In Pinkerton v. United States, [the Court] sustained a conviction of a substantive 
crime where there was no proof of participation in or knowledge of it, upon the 
novel and dubious theory that conspiracy is equivalent in law to aiding and 
abetting.”); cf. United States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406, 1426 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“At their core, the Pinkerton 
and the aider-and-abettor doctrines embody the same principle:  a defendant who 
willingly enters into a confederacy of crime can legitimately be held accountable for 
all reasonably foreseeable offenses committed by his confederates.”); Jon May, 
Pinkerton v. United States Revisited:  A Defense of Accomplice Liability, 8 NOVA L.J. 21, 40 
(1983) (“Membership in a conspiracy, however, is evidence of [a defendant’s] status 
as an accessory before the fact and, to the extent that he is an accessory before the 
fact, he is responsible for the natural and probable consequences of his actions.”).  
This account may be plausible under the facts of Pinkerton itself, given that the 
substantive offenses and aims of the conspiracy were the same.  The problem, of 
course, is that “Pinkerton liability” is significantly broader than aiding and abetting 
liability under the “natural and probable consequences” rule.  See United States v. 
Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that a conspirator’s liability for 
crimes committed by other co-conspirators is broader than an aider and abettor’s 
liability for the principal’s crimes); Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 995–96 
(discussing breadth of Pinkerton liability in relation to accomplice liability).  See 
generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. 
REV. 689 (1930) (discussing vicarious criminal liability prior to Pinkerton).  Indeed, if 
it were otherwise, there would be no need for Pinkerton liability, as all Pinkerton 
offenses would be aiding and abetting offenses.  Thus, whatever the merits of 
Pinkerton liability may be as a matter of policy, the decision does not appear to be 
justifiable as a matter of statutory interpretation.  See generally Manning, supra note 50 
(arguing that there is no statutory basis for Pinkerton liability). 
 56. May, supra note 55, at 21–24 (discussing criticisms of Pinkerton). 
 57. Id. at 23. 
 58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(a) (1962); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 358–59 (2d ed. 2003) (“Such [Pinkerton] liability might be 
justified for those at the top directing and controlling the entire operation, but it is 
clearly inappropriate to visit the same results upon the lesser participants in the 
conspiracy.”). 
 59. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 515 
(1st ed. 1972). 
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contributed to Pinkerton’s disuse was the nature of federal sentencing 
practices at the time, which led one commentator to conclude that 
potential liability for additional substantive offenses under Pinkerton 
was “not of great significance” because “only a very unimaginative 
judge would actually fix the length of the prison term on so abstract a 
basis.”60  It is worth noting, incidentally, that these dynamics likely 
help explain the lack of scholarship focused on Pinkerton, and the 
minimal treatment the case received in articles on conspiracy 
generally, during that time. 
In the early 1970s, however, things began to change as prosecutors 
started to employ Pinkerton “with increasing frequency, particularly in 
the context of narcotics prosecutions.”61  By the end of the decade, 
the case, which seemed to have one foot in the grave during the 
1960s, had become “extremely popular among state and federal 
prosecutors.”62  In the process, two of the three factors identified off-
handedly at the end of Justice Douglas’ opinion were quickly 
transforming into a rule of black letter law that permitted vicarious 
liability of a kind seemingly much broader than that envisioned by 
the Pinkerton majority.  By the early 1990s, the two-part test for 
“Pinkerton liability” had gained nearly universal acceptance among the 
courts.  As Professor Paul Marcus explained:  “In virtually every 
jurisdiction in the United States, a conspirator can be held 
responsible for crimes committed by her co-conspirators as long as 
such crimes were in furtherance of the agreement and were 
reasonably foreseeable.”63 
II. PINKERTON AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The emergence of cases treating Pinkerton’s two-prong test as a 
constitutionally based minimum requirement for imposing vicarious 
liability coincided with the rise of its use by prosecutors, possibly as a 
way of preventing the increasingly broad interpretations of vicarious 
liability under Pinkerton from tumbling out of control.64  Indeed, the 
                                                          
 60. Johnson, supra note 10, at 1165. 
 61. May, supra note 55, at 21. 
 62. Id. at 23. 
 63. Marcus, supra note 11, at 6.  But see DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 527–29 (noting 
that although the case is widely followed “one should be cautious in measuring the 
strength of the Pinkerton rule” as some states have adopted it in a more limited form). 
 64. 
While this result may at first seem harsh, liability is not unlimited.  The Court 
in Pinkerton was careful to point out that a conspirator is accountable only for 
the acts of others in furtherance of the conspiracy, i.e., those acts which were 
within the scope of or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
unlawful agreement. 
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first federal decision to use the phrase “Pinkerton charge” also held 
that its “elements” placed limits on vicarious liability in a conspiracy.  
In 1964, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered post-
conviction motions for judgments of acquittal and new trials 
stemming from a wide-ranging conspiracy in which eleven individuals 
were found guilty of conspiracy.65  Four of these defendants were also 
convicted of substantive offenses under a vicarious liability theory.66  
At trial, the court failed to instruct the jury on any of the Pinkerton 
limits, charging them that, if they found the defendants guilty of the 
conspiracy charge, they could also convict them of any “substantive 
crime committed by other alleged co-conspirators.”67  The 
government argued that the failure to include the Pinkerton elements 
in the jury charge was of no matter and that the convictions should 
be upheld because the substantive crimes were necessarily committed 
in furtherance of the conspiracy.  The court disagreed and reversed 
the convictions, finding that the defendants could not be held 
vicariously liable for substantive crimes of their co-conspirators that 
they had not reasonably foreseen.68  According to the court, the 
limitations discussed briefly at the end of Pinkerton were “elements in 
the absence of which guilt for the substantive crime could not attach 
to all conspirators.”69  Although the decision did not describe the 
Pinkerton limits as constitutionally based, its reasoning laid the 
foundation for such a determination and begged the question:  if the 
“elements” in Pinkerton’s final paragraph are not based in statute, why 
are they required for vicarious liability in a conspiracy? 
The first instances of federal courts explicitly referencing “due 
process” limitations in discussing vicarious liability under Pinkerton 
came in the mid-1970s, around the same time prosecutors were 
beginning to regularly bring Pinkerton charges against defendants.  
The phenomenon developed largely in the Fifth Circuit, where a 
handful of majority and dissenting opinions mentioned the possibility 
of constitutional limits on, or inherent in, Pinkerton just as casually as 
Justice Douglas had outlined the Pinkerton test itself.  The first 
example came in 1975, when a Fifth Circuit dissenter observed, 
                                                          
United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 65. United States v. Barrow, 229 F. Supp. 722, 724–25 (E.D. Pa. 1964), rev’d on 
other grounds, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966). 
 66. Id. at 733–34. 
 67. Id. at 733. 
 68. Id. at 734 (“Only if the particular travel by the named traveler could be 
reasonably foreseen by the non-traveling defendants could the jury convict on the 
count alleging that travel.”). 
 69. Id. 
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without elaboration, that the defendant “might raise due process 
objections to the validity of his murder conviction on the Pinkerton 
theory.”70  One year later, in United States v. Decker,71 a Fifth Circuit 
majority picked up on the remark, noting that “[w]hile holding one 
vicariously liable for the criminal acts of another may raise obvious 
due process objections, it has received considerable support in this 
Circuit in the conspiracy context.”72  In Decker, the defendant argued 
that Pinkerton was unsound and should be overruled or, in the 
alternative, that it should not apply to a drug distribution conspiracy 
where a conspirator could become “liable for any remote sale of the 
drug passing through the conspiracy.”73  The court rejected these 
arguments, though it explained that: 
[w]hile this result may at first seem harsh, liability is not unlimited.  
The Court in Pinkerton was careful to point out that a conspirator is 
accountable only for the acts of others in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, i.e., those acts which were within the scope of or were a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the unlawful agreement.74 
Finally, in 1979, the court in United States v. Moren,75 again noted 
the idea that vicarious liability “may have due process limitations” but 
found that there was no cause for concern in that case because the 
jury could have inferred actual drug possession by the defendants.76  
Thus, application of Pinkerton was “not so attenuated as to give us due 
process concerns.”77 
In 1983, the Fifth Circuit expanded on its claim that Pinkerton’s 
elements may impose constitutional minimums for vicarious liability.  
In Ferguson v. Estelle,78 the court considered a habeas corpus petition 
of two defendants who had been convicted of “arson by riot” under 
the Texas Anti-Riot statute.79  The convictions were based on their 
participation in a riot in which fifty union members “armed with 2 x 
4’s, pipes, bottles, and rocks ‘invaded’” a job site.80  Twenty of the 
rioters set fire to a trailer, but neither of the defendants was 
identified as having directly participated in the arson.81  The Anti-Riot 
                                                          
 70. Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1975) (Thornberry, J., dissenting).  
See generally Noferi, supra note 5, at 124–27 (discussing these early cases). 
 71. 543 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 72. Id. at 1103 (citing Park, 506 F.2d at 864 (Thornberry, J., dissenting)). 
 73. Id. at 1104. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 588 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 76. Id. at 493. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 718 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 79. Id. at 731. 
 80. Id. at 732. 
 81. Id. 
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statute provided that a defendant who joined a riot could be held 
vicariously liable for arson “by other participants in the riot, either in 
furtherance of the purpose of the assembly or which should have 
been anticipated as a result of the assembly.”82  Though the 
defendants did not dispute that both Pinkerton elements had been 
proven in their case, they claimed their convictions should be 
overturned because both elements were absent from the statute.  
Specifically, they argued that the Anti-Riot statute was facially 
unconstitutional “because it imposes criminal responsibility for the 
acts of another in the absence of a relationship between the 
defendant and the criminal conduct sufficiently substantial to satisfy 
the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.”83 
The court began its analysis by discussing the 1961 Supreme Court 
case Scales v. United States,84 which examined whether the Constitution 
constrained imposition of criminal liability for participating in a 
group that was engaged in both legal and illegal activity.85  In that 
setting, the Scales Court held that the concept of “personal guilt” 
under the Due Process Clause required that a defendant intend to 
assist in the illegal aims of a group before criminal liability may be 
imposed based on associating with a group that was engaged in illegal 
activity.86  After its discussion of Scales, the Fifth Circuit turned to 
vicarious liability under the Texas statute and found that, despite the 
potential for concern in some cases, the defendants’ convictions were 
constitutional because both of the Pinkerton elements had in fact been 
shown.87  The court concluded, however, that, “[i]f, on the facts of a 
particular case, it should appear that either [Pinkerton element] is 
absent, an important question would arise.  But the petitioners have 
not suggested that theirs is such a case, and they are without standing 
to raise the potential problems of others.”88 
In the middle of the 1980’s, the idea that Pinkerton’s test for 
vicarious liability was constitutionally required began to gain broader 
acceptance and spread outside of the Fifth Circuit.  In the 1985 case 
United States v. Alvarez,89 the Eleventh Circuit provided the most 
detailed discussion to that date of the constitutional limits on 
                                                          
 82. Id. at 735 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. 
 84. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).  This case is discussed in more detail below.  See infra 
Part III (exploring the basis for constitutional limits on Pinkerton liability). 
 85. Estelle, 718 F.2d at 735–36 (discussing Scales). 
 86. 367 U.S. at 225. 
 87. Estelle, 718 F.2d at 736. 
 88. Id. (citing Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48). 
 89. 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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vicarious liability in a conspiracy and implied that the Pinkerton limits 
themselves may not be sufficient to meet due process concerns in all 
instances.  In Alvarez, a cocaine deal initiated by two undercover 
federal agents turned into a shoot-out when one of the sellers heard 
backup agents approaching the motel room where the transaction 
was taking place.90  During the mêlée, one of the sellers shot and 
killed one of the undercover officers.91  Three co-conspirators were 
convicted of murder under a Pinkerton theory.92  One had served as an 
armed lookout during the incident, another introduced the agents to 
the “leader” of the conspiracy and was present during the shooting, 
and the third acted as a Spanish to English translator during the 
incident.93 
The defendants argued that their convictions were 
unconstitutional because they were not sufficiently individually 
culpable for the killing.94  They claimed that the murder was too 
distinct from the purposes of the drug transaction and that their 
individual roles in the conspiracy were too minor to countenance 
criminal liability.95  The government argued that those considerations 
should be left to the prosecutor and that “prosecutorial discretion 
would protect truly ‘minor participants’” in a conspiracy from 
unwarranted criminal liability.96  The court rejected this view, and 
strongly indicated that it believed due process might require 
constraints on vicarious liability beyond the Pinkerton limitations.97  
Specifically, it found no authority for the government’s contention 
“that all conspirators, regardless of individual culpability, may be held 
responsible under Pinkerton for” substantive crimes that were 
“reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended.”98  The court 
implied that vicarious liability for such crimes could only be imposed 
if the defendant was not a minor participant in the conspiracy and 
knew there was a strong likelihood that the foreseeable, but originally 
                                                          
 90. Id. at 830–39. 
 91. Id. at 838–39. 
 92. Id. at 839. 
 93. Id. at 851. 
 94. Id. at 849–51. 
 95. Id. at 849. 
 96. Id. at 850 n.25. 
 97. See id. (“In our view, the liability of such ‘minor’ participants must rest on a 
more substantial foundation than the mere whim of the prosecutor.”); see also id. at 
850 (“Furthermore, we are mindful of the potential due process limitations on the 
Pinkerton doctrine in cases involving attenuated relationships between the 
conspirator and the substantive crime.”). 
 98. Id. 
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unintended, crime would be committed.99  The court concluded, 
however, that the “individual culpability” of the defendants in that 
case was “sufficient,” because “the relationship between the 
[defendants] and the murder was not so attenuated as to run afoul of 
the potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine.”100 
In addition to being the first case to imply that the Constitution 
might preclude a conviction even where the Pinkerton test had 
apparently been satisfied, Alvarez is noteworthy as an indication of 
how far vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators had stretched 
beyond the category of offenses that was at issue in Pinkerton.  The 
Alvarez court addressed this fact directly in its analysis by identifying 
three different categories of substantive offenses that might be 
punishable under the Pinkerton test.  “The first and most common” is 
where the substantive crime “is also one of the primary goals of the 
alleged conspiracy,” as was the case in Pinkerton.101  The second is 
where the substantive crime directly facilitates one of the conspiracy’s 
primary goals:  for example, illegal gun possession during a bank 
robbery.102  Though the second category is beyond the conduct at 
issue in Pinkerton, the Alvarez court characterized it as within the 
heartland of “Pinkerton liability,” which was no doubt true by 1985.103  
The final category—and the one at issue in Alvarez—involves 
substantive crimes that are committed in furtherance of the 
conspiracy and are reasonably foreseeable, but were “not within the 
originally intended scope of the conspiracy.”104  The court 
characterized liability for the third category of crimes as not typical 
but also “not wholly unprecedented.”105  The court’s concern about 
the expansiveness of the third category seemed, in large part, to drive 
its concern that due process might constrain Pinkerton’s test. 
Following Alvarez, a number of other courts echoed the idea that 
Pinkerton’s limits were constitutionally based.  By 1991, the Fourth, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had all indicated their support for the 
proposition that due process required, at a minimum, the Pinkerton 
                                                          
 99. Id. at 850–51 (holding that the conviction did not run afoul of “potential due 
process concerns” because “all three appellants had actual knowledge of at least 
some of the circumstances and events leading up to the murder . . . were aware that 
deadly force might be used,” and “were more than ‘minor’ participants in the drug 
conspiracy”). 
 100. Id. at 851. 
 101. Id. at 850 n.24. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (“In either of these two categories, Pinkerton liability can be imposed on all 
conspirators because the substantive crime is squarely within the intended scope of 
the conspiracy.”). 
 104. Id. at 850. 
 105. Id. at 850 n.25. 
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limits on vicarious liability.106  The first reversal of a Pinkerton 
conviction on due process grounds came in 1993, in the Ninth 
Circuit case United States v. Castaneda.107  In Castaneda, Leticia 
Castaneda’s husband was involved in a large-scale heroin and cocaine 
business.  Her role in the business appeared to be limited primarily to 
delivering phone messages related to drug transactions between her 
husband and other conspirators on a handful of occasions.  On one 
occasion, for example, Leticia was engaged in a social phone 
conversation with one of the co-conspirators when her husband asked 
her to relay information about his efforts to sell drugs, which she 
did.108  The strongest evidence against her was that, in one phone 
conversation, she “active[ly] participat[ed]” in the conspiracy by 
volunteering “that a street-level dealer had been arrested and that a 
deal involving [another individual] had fallen through . . . .”109  Based 
on this evidence, Castaneda was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 
heroin and cocaine and, vicariously of seven counts of possession of a 
firearm in relation to a drug offense.110  Six of the firearm convictions 
stemmed from another conspirator’s possession of drugs and the 
seventh was based on her own conspiracy conviction.111 
Castaneda challenged her convictions on a number of grounds but 
not on the basis of substantive due process.  The court, however, 
raised the issue sua sponte as an error that was “obvious” and “seriously 
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public relations of the judicial 
proceeding.”112  It framed its due process analysis in terms of 
Pinkerton’s reasonable foreseeability requirement113 and conducted its 
foreseeability inquiry from the perspective of Castaneda’s role in the 
                                                          
 106. See United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The 
foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton is also the main concern underlying a 
possible due process violation.”); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 112 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (finding that convictions were not “so attenuated as to run afoul of 
possible due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine”); United States v. 
Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We recognize the potential due 
process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine in cases involving attenuated 
relationships between the conspirator and the substantive crime.”).  In addition, a 
number of other state courts held that due process constrains vicarious liability in a 
conspiracy.  See Noferi, supra note 5, at 134–37 (discussing state court decisions).  
Some state courts have also held that due process limits vicarious criminal liability 
outside of the conspiracy setting.  See Neil Colman McCabe, State Constitutions and 
Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 536–41 (1998) (reviewing cases). 
 107. 9 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 108. Id. at 767. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 764. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 766. 
 113. See id. (“The question is, was it reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that a 
firearm would be used in relation to the predicate [possession] offense[s]?”). 
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conspiracy and knowledge of the drug organization, as opposed to 
the overall scope of the conspiracy.114  “[G]iven Leticia’s lack of 
participation in the conspiracy and her lack of involvement with the 
predicate offenses,” the court determined that, it could not 
“conclude, without violating the fundamental precepts of due 
process, that Leticia could have foreseen the other conspirators’ use 
of firearms in relation to the predicate offenses.”115 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach in Castaneda sheds light on the key 
role that scope plays in a Pinkerton analysis, and in the application of 
Pinkerton’s limitations as a rule of constitutional law.  As discussed in 
more depth below, the extent of liability under Pinkerton depends in 
large part on whether the test is applied based on the scope of each 
individual’s agreement (or participation) or on the scope of the 
overall conspiracy.  Though the court did not address the question of 
how to define the scope of a conspiracy directly, its implicit narrow 
approach to that issue was a determinative factor in the result it 
reached.116  Conspicuously absent from the court’s decision, however, 
was a detailed explanation of why Pinkerton’s limits are 
constitutionally required.  The court’s discussion on this point was 
limited to its observation that “[s]everal circuits, including this one” 
recognize that due process constrains the overly broad application of 
vicarious liability under Pinkerton and its conclusion that Pinkerton’s 
reasonably foreseeable prong was the main concept underlying a due 
process analysis.117 
III. PINKERTON AND PERSONAL GUILT 
Since Castaneda, the First,118 Seventh,119 and Tenth Circuits120 have 
joined the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh in characterizing 
                                                          
 114. Id. at 767. 
 115. Id. at 768. 
 116. See id. at 767 (explaining that “[t]he evidence does not show that she knew 
much about Uriel’s or Barron’s organizations, that she knew the low-level 
distributors involved, [nor] that she had any knowledge of Angulo-Lopez’s 
organization”). 
 117. Id. at 766. 
 118. See United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F.3d 163, 196 (1st Cir. 2000) (“We 
agree with appellant that ‘due process constrains the application of Pinkerton where 
the relationship between the defendant and the substantive offense is slight.’” 
(quoting Castaneda, 9 F.3d at 766)). 
 119. United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing conviction 
on the grounds that it was “an unwarranted, and possibly unconstitutional, 
expansion of the Pinkerton doctrine” (citing Castaneda, 9 F.3d at 766)). 
 120. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
extending Pinkerton liability to cover crimes removed from the original object of the 
conspiracy “appears incompatible with the due process limitations inherent in 
Pinkerton”). 
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Pinkerton’s test as a due process-based limit on vicarious liability for 
the acts of co-conspirators.  The remaining circuits—the Second, 
Third, Eighth and D.C. Circuits—have never reached the issue.  
Despite this near consensus, however, no court has provided more 
than a cursory explanation of the basis for treating Pinkerton’s limits 
as constitutionally mandated or, more fundamentally, why the 
Constitution limits vicarious criminal liability at all.  Only the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits articulated a possible rationale for their 
conclusion, by referencing concepts of “personal guilt” and 
“individual culpability” respectively.121  Neither court, however, 
explained these ideas in any detail nor analyzed why they might 
warrant adopting Pinkerton’s test as a due process limit on vicarious 
criminal liability as opposed to other approaches. 
The lack of analysis on this point is particularly surprising given 
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized “personal guilt” as 
a substantive due process limit on civil and criminal liability for the 
acts of others.122  Although the Supreme Court’s personal guilt 
jurisprudence developed largely in the context of challenges to the 
anti-Communist measures of the McCarthy era,123 the Court also 
mentioned the importance of personal guilt in some of its conspiracy 
decisions from the same time period.124  At its core, the rule prohibits 
“guilt by association” in the absence of a substantial relationship 
between the defendant and the third party’s criminal activity.  An 
individual cannot be held vicariously liable merely because she 
associates with a group or third party that commits a crime.  There 
must be a sufficient, “non-tenuous,”125 link between her association 
and the third party’s criminal actions.  Though a few courts have off-
handedly mentioned the “personal guilt” concept in characterizing 
                                                          
 121. See supra Part II (discussing United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 
1976), United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1979), Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 
F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1983), and United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 122. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945) (“The doctrine of personal 
guilt is one of the most fundamental principles of our jurisprudence.  It partakes of 
the very essence of the concept of freedom and due process of law.”); Cole, supra 
note 20, at 218 (“In the wake of Scales, the Court consistently applied the ‘specific 
intent’ standard to a range of anti-Communist statutes, including many that imposed 
only a civil disability.”). 
 123. See Cole, supra note 20, at 215–16 (describing the history of the personal guilt 
requirement). 
 124. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 772 (1946) (“Guilt with us 
remains individual and personal, even as respects conspiracies.  It is not a matter of 
mass application.”). 
 125. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226 (1961) (stating personal guilt 
requires an “analysis of the relationship between the fact of membership and the 
underlying substantive illegal conduct, in order to determine whether that 
relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its use as the basis of criminal liability”). 
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Pinkerton’s limits as constitutionally mandated,126 a close examination 
of the doctrine adds significant weight to that position and, perhaps 
more importantly for our purposes, helps build a foundation for 
understanding on what it might mean for other areas of vicarious 
criminal liability. 
The most detailed explanation of the personal guilt requirement 
came in Scales, in 1961, when the Supreme Court considered a 
provision of the Smith Act that made it a crime to be a member of 
the Communist Party.  In Scales, Julius Irving Scales challenged a 
conviction under the Smith Act, which made it a felony to be a 
“knowing” member “in any organization which advocates the 
overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or 
violence.”127  In an effort to square the statute with constitutional 
protections, the trial court interpreted it very narrowly to require a 
showing that the defendant was an “active” member in the 
organization and that he acted with the specific intent of achieving 
the group’s unlawful aims.128  With this limiting construction in place, 
the trial court convicted Scales based on his membership in the 
Communist Party.  Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the law 
ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s substantive due process 
protection by impermissibly imputing guilt without “some concrete 
involvement in criminal conduct.”129 
                                                          
 126. Recently, Mark Noferi insightfully observed the potential relationship 
between Scales’ personal guilt requirement and due process limits on vicarious 
liability under Pinkerton.  Noferi, supra note 5, at 116–19 (providing an overview of 
Scales).  His analysis, however, did not explore what this might mean for the Pinkerton 
test itself but instead focused on proposing a constitutional limit on vicarious liability 
beyond the Pinkerton limits.  See id. at 147–52 (proposing a new due process limit on 
Pinkerton liability and discussing the concept of personal guilt).  No other 
commentator appears to have discussed Scales in relation to Pinkerton. 
 127. Scales, 367 U.S. at 205. 
 128. Id. at 220. 
 129. Id.  Scales also challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds, 
arguing that the Smith Act violated his right of freedom of association.  Id. at 228.  
The Court rejected Scales’ First Amendment claim on similar but narrower grounds 
than his due process argument.  Id. at 230.  Specifically, it held that the conviction 
did not violate Scales’ associational rights because he specifically intended to 
accomplish the illegal ends of the organization.  Id. at 229.  The Court began its brief 
First Amendment analysis with a comparison to criminal conspiracy laws.  Id.  In a 
typical conspiracy, “all knowing association with the conspiracy is a proper subject for 
criminal proscription as far as First Amendment liberties are concerned” because the 
conspiracy is “defined by its unlawful purpose.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Although the 
Smith Act presented a different situation by reaching groups that had both legal and 
illegal aims, the Court found that the added “specific intent” requirement was 
sufficient to ensure that a “member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the 
advancement of legitimate aims and policies [would] not fall within the ban of the 
statute . . . .”  Id.  According to the Court, this limiting construction prevented the 
danger that the statute would impair legitimate expression and associations.  See id. 
(noting the membership clause should only be construed as far as necessary to deal 
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Though the Court upheld Scales’ conviction based on the trial 
court’s constrained interpretation of the Smith Act, it agreed that the 
Due Process Clause requires a minimum level of “personal guilt” in 
order to impose criminal liability based on the actions of a third 
party.130  This requirement is substantive, not procedural, and 
prohibits punishing an individual for another’s acts unless she has a 
sufficient connection to those acts.  The Scales Court explained that 
the key issue in determining whether the personal guilt requirement 
has been met is the relationship between the defendant’s conduct 
and the third party’s concededly illegal activity:   
when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can 
only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or 
conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of 
violent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to 
satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.131 
Accordingly, the Court noted, criminal liability cannot be based on 
passive membership in an organization engaged in illegal activity 
because membership alone does not ensure a sufficiently substantial 
relationship between the defendant and the criminal acts.132 
Though the Court did not spell out a precise test for determining 
whether the “substantial relationship” requirement has been met in a 
given case, it highlighted two factors in upholding Scales’ conviction:  
knowledge of and intent to further the criminal activity and a 
minimum level of active involvement in working to achieve the 
organization’s illegal ends.133  These factors indicate that a 
                                                          
with groups with illegal aims); see also Cole, supra note 20, at 218 (“Under the First 
Amendment [as interpreted in Scales], then, the ‘specific intent’ standard is 
necessary to tailor the government’s regulation to the harms it may legitimately 
regulate and to minimize the infringement of lawful association.”).  Thus, under 
Scales, the right of association limits criminal penalties only insofar as they may 
infringe on legitimate associations.  If the group is an entirely criminal enterprise, 
however, then its members can be punished simply for knowingly associating with it, 
without undercutting the First Amendment.  Scales, 367 U.S. at 229.  By contrast, the 
Due Process Clause personal guilt concept requires a substantial relationship 
between the individual and the punishable activity or acts; mere membership is not 
enough.  See id. at 225 (“Membership, without more, in an organization engaged in 
illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to 
[satisfy the requirement of personal guilt.]”).  Professor David Cole offers a 
persuasive argument against this view of associational rights, on the theory that 
virtually all associations have both legal and illegal aims.  See Cole, supra note 20, at 
222 (“[I]t is undoubtedly the rare gang that engages exclusively in illegal behavior.  
Gangs also provide social activities and networks of support to their members.”). 
 130. Scales, 367 U.S. at 224–25. 
 131. Id. (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. at 225. 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 227 n.18 (noting that personal guilt problems in ascribing 
criminal acts to an organization were “certainly cured, so far as any particular 
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relationship between a defendant and another’s criminal activity 
must be based on a minimally culpable mental state and a level of 
active assistance or influence in order for it to be sufficiently 
substantial for personal guilt. 
As an initial matter, the Scales Court compared the Smith Act with 
conspiracy and complicity law and found that those doctrines dispel 
“[a]ny thought that due process puts beyond the reach of the 
criminal law all individual associational relationships, unless 
accompanied by the commission of specific acts of criminality . . . .”134  
Punishment for involvement in an associational relationship does not 
impermissibly constitute guilt by association, the Court explained, so 
long as the defendant “knowingly works in the ranks of that 
organization, intending to contribute to the success of those 
specifically illegal activities . . . .”135  But, knowledge or intent to assist 
in another’s illegal acts is not by itself sufficient to permit 
punishment.  There must be something more concrete.  Again, 
drawing from the law of conspiracy, the Court pointed to its 
requirement that a conspirator commit to act in furtherance of the 
illegal aims of the enterprise.136  Requiring a commitment to act to 
help bring about the prescribed conduct prevents punishment for 
knowledge of illegal activity or the “mere[] . . . expression of 
sympathy with the alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any 
significant action in its support or any commitment to undertake 
such action.”137  In other words, in order to establish personal guilt for 
another’s illegal acts, a defendant must influence or attempt to 
influence the illegal conduct, not just know about or sympathize with 
it.  The Scales Court concluded that the trial court’s interpretation of 
the Smith Act, which limited application to active members, satisfied 
this requirement.138 
                                                          
defendant is concerned, by the requirement of proof that he knew that the 
organization engages in criminal advocacy, and that it was his purpose to further that 
criminal advocacy”); id. at 226–27 (“[W]e can perceive no reason why one who 
actively and knowingly works in the ranks of that organization, intending to 
contribute to the success of those specifically illegal activities, should be any more 
immune from prosecution than he to whom the organization has assigned the task of 
carrying out the substantive criminal act.”). 
 134. Id. at 225. 
 135. Id. at 227. 
 136. Id. at 227–28 (“It may indeed be argued that such [moral] assent and 
encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal 
enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part of a conspirator to 
act in furtherance of that enterprise.”). 
 137. Id. at 228. 
 138. See id. (noting that constitutional concerns “are duly met when the statute is 
found to reach only ‘active’ members having also a guilty knowledge and intent”). 
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At first blush, one might wonder whether Scales mandates 
significantly stricter standards than Pinkerton’s for vicarious criminal 
liability:  namely, intent to contribute to and actively assist each 
substantive offense.  After all, as with liability under the Smith Act, 
vicarious criminal liability in any setting is “justified by reference to 
the relationship of . . . [a defendant’s] status or conduct to other 
concededly criminal activity”139 and accordingly might implicate 
personal guilt in the same way as in Scales.  Of course, such strict 
requirements would be dramatically inconsistent not just with 
Pinkerton but also with traditional accomplice liability rules, which 
permitted liability for substantive crimes that a defendant knew his 
accomplice was likely to commit, but which he did not intend to 
assist.140  A key distinction between the Smith Act and true vicarious 
liability, however, indicates that personal guilt is unlikely to require 
nearly so much in most settings. 
The Smith Act, like the crime of conspiracy, punished the act of 
associating with others for a criminal purpose.  It did not hold 
defendants liable for another’s “specific acts of criminality,”141 but for 
participating in an illegal enterprise.142  This, of course, is not true 
vicarious liability. In Scales, the conviction was “justified by 
reference”143 to others’ criminal activity only in the sense that that 
activity is what made Scales’ own act of knowing and intentional 
participation in the organization a crime.  If the organization had not 
been engaged in “concededly illegal activity,”144 then Scales’ active 
and knowing membership would have been entirely innocent.  Thus, 
to ensure convictions meet with personal guilt limits in a Smith Act or 
substantive conspiracy setting, there must be a strict requirement.  
Otherwise, people could be punished simply for being friends or 
associates with someone who turns out to have been committing 
crimes. 
True vicarious criminal liability as it currently exists presents a 
related, but distinct, personal guilt problem.  Rules like the Pinkerton 
doctrine, the natural and probable consequences rule of accomplice 
liability, and the felony murder doctrine, explicitly base criminal 
                                                          
 139. Id. at 224–25. 
 140. See Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 995–96 (describing traditional rules 
of complicity and vicarious liability). 
 141. Scales, 367 U.S. at 225. 
 142. See id. at 227 n.18 (“Understood in this way, there is no great difference 
between a charge of being a member in a group which engages in criminal conduct 
and being a member of a large conspiracy, many of whose participants are unknown 
or not before the court.”). 
 143. Id. at 224. 
 144. Id. at 225. 
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liability on another’s actions.  But, they do so only after the 
defendant has already intentionally become involved in a criminal 
enterprise.  As a result, under current criminal vicarious liability rules 
there is already at least some punishable relationship between the 
defendant and the third party that commits the underlying 
substantive offense.145  Needless to say, this fact does not eliminate 
guilt by association concerns in these settings—for example, 
punishing someone involved in a criminal enterprise for another 
member’s crimes that were entirely unrelated to the enterprise would 
surely be impermissible—but it helps explain why stringent 
requirements like those imposed in Scales may not be required to 
establish personal guilt in the context of standard vicarious criminal 
liability.  The central question is whether there is a substantial 
relationship between the defendant’s criminal conduct or agreement 
and the particular substantive offense. 
Before more closely examining Pinkerton’s limits in light of the 
personal guilt requirement, it is worth noting that the Scales Court 
did briefly, albeit in passing, observe the problem vicarious liability in 
the conspiracy setting may pose for personal guilt.  Specifically, in a 
footnote on the law of complicity and conspiracy, the Court noted 
that “genuine [personal guilt] problems arise as to whether a 
conspirator is, by reason of his conspiracy to be considered an 
accomplice and therefore guilty also of the substantive offense.”146  
Though the Court did not elaborate on this somewhat cryptic 
remark,147 it supported the assertion by citing two authorities that had 
been highly critical of the expansive application of Pinkerton:148  a 
draft of the Model Penal Code, which rejected Pinkerton liability 
entirely,149 and a section of a Harvard Law Review piece that argued, 
among other things, that “[n]o court which has taken the Pinkerton 
approach has offered an adequate rationale for convicting a 
conspirator for the crimes of his associates.”150  Though this passage 
does not offer much help for determining how the personal guilt 
                                                          
 145. Needless to say, a different case would arise if vicarious criminal liability were 
imposed without an existing criminal relationship. 
 146. Id. at 227 n.17. 
 147. Id. (“But we are solely concerned here with pointing up the accepted limits of 
imputation of guilt, not with exploring the problems created by the various 
provisions by which such imputation is effected.”). 
 148. See id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE 20–33 (Tentative Draft No. 1 1953)); 
Criminal conspiracy, supra note 10, at 993–1000. 
 149. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
(reaffirming that criminal liability is based on conduct, but that liability can still be 
applied to situations where the conduct is that of another). 
 150. Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 998. 
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requirement might apply to Pinkerton, it does indicate that the Scales 
Court believed that some due process constraints would apply to 
vicarious liability in the conspiracy setting. 
As discussed above, the due process personal guilt requirement is 
satisfied only if there is a “sufficiently substantial” relationship 
between the defendant’s conduct and the “other concededly criminal 
activity.”151  In a Pinkerton case, the relevant inquiry is the relationship 
between the defendant’s agreement or participation in the 
conspiracy and the substantive crimes.  The two factors that 
established this relationship in Scales—(1) specific intent and 
(2) active assistance152—closely track the two Pinkerton factors, which 
require a knowing agreement in combination with negligence for 
crimes that further the agreement and a minimum “causal” or 
influential link between the defendant’s participation in the 
conspiracy and each substantive crime.153 
Most of the courts that have interpreted Pinkerton’s test as a 
constitutional minimum have focused on the requirement that the 
substantive crime have been “reasonably foreseeable” to the 
defendant.154  This element, in effect, sets a mens rea of negligence 
                                                          
 151. Scales, 367 U.S. at 224–25. 
 152.  
We think, however, [the personal guilt requirement is] duly met when the 
statute is found to reach only “active” members having also a guilty 
knowledge and intent, and which therefore prevents a conviction on what 
otherwise might be regarded as merely an expression of sympathy with the 
alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any significant action in its 
support or any commitment to undertake such action. 
Id. at 228. 
 153. As discussed above, the Scales Court’s requirements of knowledge, specific 
intent, and “significant action . . . or [a] commitment to undertake such action” in 
support of the concededly criminal conduct, are more stringent than the Pinkerton 
requirements.  Id.  This difference appears to be adequately explained by the fact 
that Pinkerton vicarious liability attaches only after an individual has already 
committed a crime by knowingly entering the conspiracy, whereas Scales concerns 
liability for entering into the forbidden association in the first instance.  Of course, 
one might argue that personal guilt or theories of punishment warrant stricter mens 
rea and causation requirements in all cases.  See Noferi, supra note 5, at 124–33, 147–
55 (arguing that the Constitution requires an “attenuation” limit on vicarious liability 
under Pinkerton); cf. Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of 
Accomplice Liability:  New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 120–40 
(arguing for a stricter causation requirement in the imposition of accomplice 
liability); Robinson, supra note 10, at 638 (“Under the complicity aspect of felony 
murder, the Pinkerton doctrine, and the natural and probable consequences rule, a 
defendant may be held liable for an offense even though he does not satisfy the 
[mental state] culpability requirements of the offense.”).  For purposes of analyzing 
cases holding Pinkerton’s requirements to be rooted in due process, however, it is 
sufficient to point out that the mental and causal components of the Pinkerton 
requirements are similar in nature to the elements in Scales. 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 766–68 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing the due process limits of Pinkerton). 
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for substantive crimes committed in furtherance of the agreement.155  
Many commentators and some courts have strongly criticized this fact 
and argued that negligence “is not a usual criminal law concept and 
surely not a concept that puts meaningful due process limits on 
criminal liability.”156  While the critique of negligence in the area of 
vicarious liability is persuasive in many ways, limiting application to 
crimes that were a foreseeable result of a knowing and unlawful 
agreement arguably has a footing in the “ancient” principle that “an 
actor is responsible for the unintended harms resulting from an 
unlawful act.”157  In any event, whether or not the Due Process Clause 
may possibly require more, it seems that Scales’ personal guilt 
requirement, at a minimum, would require negligence with respect 
to others’ crimes for vicarious liability.158  If a defendant could not 
reasonably have foreseen that one of her co-conspirators would 
commit the substantive crime in furtherance of their jointly 
undertaken agreement, then her relationship to that crime would be 
at least as “tenuous”159 as the types of links rejected in Scales.160  Under 
a strict liability standard, a defendant could be held liable for crimes 
she did not in any way “aid and encourage[]”161 and, indeed, had no 
reason to think would occur.  If the concept of “personal guilt” and 
the “substantial relationship” requirement mean anything in the 
context of Pinkerton, presumably they mean that a defendant must 
                                                          
 155. See United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 n.3 (D. Mass. 2003) 
(“‘Foreseeability’ is the language of negligence law.”); Pauley, supra note 11, at 6 
(“The ‘reasonably foreseeable’ component of the Pinkerton doctrine in effect imputes 
criminal liability for what the Model Penal Code calls negligence.”).  But see Wilkins 
& Steer, supra note 53, at 512 (arguing that it is not settled whether the reasonably 
foreseeable standard is an “objective of subjective” standard). 
 156. See Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68 n.3; see also Paul Silvio Berra, Jr., Co-
Conspirator Liability under 18 U.S.C. 924(c):  Is It Possible to Escape, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 603, 
630 (arguing that “the reasonable foreseeability standard is not an appropriate basis 
for assessing co-conspirator guilt, as it punishes for mere negligence”); supra note 10 
(discussing the major articles on conspiracy since 1959). 
 157. Binder, supra note 3, at 73. 
 158. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:  ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136 (Oxford Univ. Press 1968) (noting that there is “a world of 
difference between punishing people for the harm they unintentionally but 
carelessly cause, and punishing them for the harm which no exercise or reasonable 
care on their part could have avoided”). 
 159. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226 (1961) (“[T]he enquiry here must 
direct itself to an analysis of the relationship between the fact of membership and the 
underlying substantive illegal conduct, in order to determine whether that 
relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its use as the basis of criminal liability.”). 
 160. See id. at 228 (rejecting vicarious liability based on “merely an expression of 
sympathy” with another’s crimes). 
 161. Id. at 227. 
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have some minimally culpable mental state with respect to the “other 
concededly criminal activity.”162 
Though courts holding that the Pinkerton test is rooted in due 
process have generally focused on its “reasonably foreseeable” prong, 
the “in furtherance of” requirement touches on an equally important 
aspect of the relationship between a defendant’s conduct and the 
third party’s crimes:  actus reus and causation.  In the area of 
vicarious liability, causation is perhaps even more closely wedded to 
personal guilt than mens rea163 because it “links the actor to the 
[third party’s act and resulting] harm.”164  Accordingly, in Scales, the 
Court required active membership to prevent against liability based 
on a “mere[] expression of sympathy”165 with another’s criminal acts.  
Of course, the “in furtherance of” standard, like “active assistance,” is 
a far cry from true but-for causation.  A defendant can be convicted 
under Pinkerton of a substantive crime that would have been 
committed exactly as it was without her participation.166  Still, the “in 
                                                          
 162. See id. at 225; see also United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 
1991) (“The foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton is also the main concern 
underlying a possible due process violation.”). 
 163. See Dressler, supra note 153, at 103 (“Causation, then, is the instrument we 
employ to ensure that responsibility is personal.”).  Another possible account of 
vicarious criminal liability is as an exception to the rule that one does not have a 
“duty to act” to prevent a crime or harm from occurring.  One might argue that by 
entering into a criminal agreement, an individual creates the risk that additional 
crimes will be committed in furtherance of that agreement and, as a result, can justly 
be punished for the “omission” of preventing those crimes.  Cf. Jones v. Indiana, 43 
N.E.2d 1017, 1018–19 (Ind. 1942) (defendant had a duty to rescue a woman who 
jumped or fell into a creek after he raped her because he created the risk that led to 
her death). 
 164. Dressler, supra note 153, at 103; see Sayre, supra note 55, at 702 (noting 
causation as a key element of “the fundamental, intensely personal, basis of criminal 
liability”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 588–89 (2d ed. 
1991) (“Criminal acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy may be sufficiently 
dependant upon the encouragement and material support of the group as a whole to 
warrant treating each member as a causal agent to each act.”).  There is a persuasive 
argument that results cannot form the basis of moral blameworthiness and that 
culpability should be based on intentional actions that risk a harmful result.  See 
Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 
366 (“[T]he consequences of action cannot be fully guided and are thus not 
appropriate predicates for desert. Full culpability and desert are established by 
intentional action that risks a harmful result.”).  This Article, however, explores the 
concept of personal guilt as it relates to Pinkerton and a traditional understanding of 
vicarious liability in criminal law.  Accordingly, an examination of the argument 
against the use of results in criminal law is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 165. Scales, 367 U.S. at 228. 
 166. See Dressler, supra note 153, at 102 (observing that in the area of accomplice 
liability, an accomplice “is accountable for the actions of the perpetrator even if the 
desired consequences would have occurred precisely when they did without her 
conduct”); Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 446–48 (2007) (explaining that “vicarious accomplices” do not 
causally contribute to the result of the underlying offense). 
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furtherance of” requirement addresses the same underlying concern 
as causation, despite the fact that it is less rigorous.  It ensures that 
the defendant influenced or attempted to influence167 the substantive 
crime.  Indeed, without the “in furtherance of” requirement, a 
conspirator could be convicted of substantive crimes that had no 
relationship (beyond mere coincidence) to his actions.  For example, 
returning to the hypothetical example from the beginning of this 
Article, if I knew that my co-conspirator enjoyed smoking marijuana, 
I could certainly have “reasonably foreseen” that he would purchase 
some during the course of planning our bank robbery, but that 
would not establish a relationship between our agreement and his 
purchase.  The “in furtherance of” requirement, like the “active 
assistance” requirement in Scales, ensures there is a link between the 
defendant’s conduct and the third party’s crime not just between the 
defendant and the third person. 
The above discussion helps to fill in some of the holes left by the 
courts that have held that Pinkerton establishes a constitutional floor 
for vicarious criminal liability.  In Scales, the Supreme Court held that 
in order to establish personal guilt for another’s actions, there must 
be a substantial relationship between the defendant and the third 
party’s conduct.  This substantial relationship rule clarifies why the 
Pinkerton test might provide a due process limit on vicarious criminal 
liability.  By requiring that a defendant at least have been able to 
foresee that his co-conspirator would commit a particular crime to 
further their illegal agreement, the Pinkerton doctrine ties the crime 
to the defendant’s illegal conduct—the agreement.  Without these 
limits on liability, a person could be held liable for another’s 
substantive crimes based exclusively on a “guilt by association” theory 
because conspirators could be convicted of crimes committed by one 
another that were entirely unrelated to the conspiracy, simply by 
virtue of the fact that they were co-conspirators.  In short, Scales 
appears to provide a strong foundation for the consistent but often 
hollow string of cases finding that due process requires the Pinkerton 
                                                          
 167. For example, Neal Kumar Katyal defends Pinkerton liability because it 
accounts for the influence a conspirator has in bringing about her partners’ crimes.  
See Katyal, supra note 9, at 1372 (“[A] broad range of evidence suggests that 
conspirators often do influence, in profound ways, each other’s behavior, not simply 
through their direct commands but also by their mere presence.”).  This relationship 
of influence is non-existent for crimes that are independent of, and do not further, 
the conspiratorial agreement.  See Pauley, supra note 11, at 6 (quoting the President 
of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ statement that Pinkerton 
“permits the government to hold a defendant criminally liable for all reasonably 
foreseeable acts of co-conspirators regardless of actual knowledge, intent, or 
participation”). 
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limits.  More importantly for our purposes, however, this 
understanding of the personal guilt concept is helpful in exploring 
some of the ways in which that line of cases might impact other areas 
of criminal law if courts were to apply them seriously and consistently. 
IV. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND PERSONAL GUILT IN OTHER AREAS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Whether or not one agrees with the decisions that have found the 
Pinkerton limits to be constitutionally required, if courts that have 
adopted this position begin to apply it in other areas of criminal law, 
it could have a potentially significant impact on a wide range of areas 
of criminal law:  from strict liability to the willful blindness doctrine.  
The most likely areas of impact, however, are in the context of other 
vicarious liability rules.  This section analyzes three vicarious liability 
doctrines:  (1) the definition of the “scope” of an agreement in 
conspiracy law, (2) the felony murder rule as applied to killings by co-
felons, and (3) the “material support” provision of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act.  Cases recognizing Pinkerton as a due 
process minimum pose difficult challenges in each area and indicate 
that important adjustments may be needed in order to be consistent 
with the requirement of personal guilt. 
A. Scope 
Determining the “scope” of a conspiracy has historically been one 
of the most confusing and frustrating tasks in conspiracy law.168  
Rarely is a criminal enterprise organized like a legitimate business, 
with clearly delineated lines and participants.  And, even in cases 
where conspirators have readily defined roles, there is still no bright 
line test for determining whether a given defendant—particularly 
one with minimal involvement in the group—should be prosecuted 
as part of a single far-reaching “conspiracy” or as part of a smaller 
conspiratorial group.169  The guidelines that courts have adopted to 
resolve these problems pre-date the rise of Pinkerton and were shaped 
                                                          
 168. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 422–23 (1985) (“Much of the most 
perplexing litigation in conspiracy has been concerned less with the essential 
elements of the offense than with the scope to be accorded to a combination . . . .”); 
see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992) (describing the 
“age-old problem of what constitutes a [single] conspiracy”). 
 169. See Scott v. United States, 255 F.2d 18, 20 (4th Cir. 1958) (“[I]t is not always 
easy to determine the proper unit for purposes of prosecution.  In some instances 
each day’s action or inaction is made a separate offense; in others a longer course of 
action constitutes a single offense . . . . Where to draw the line, in the absence of 
clear statutory delineation, presents a problem to one’s judgment and sense of 
fairness.”). 
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primarily by evidentiary and practical concerns170 at a time when the 
scope of a conspiracy was largely irrelevant to a defendant’s sentence 
or substantive criminal liability.171  Cases were brought under the 
general federal conspiracy statute, which did not link the severity of 
the offense to the scope or object of the conspiracy.172  Thus, a 
defendant’s punishment was generally the same whether she was 
convicted as part of one large trial of a broadly defined conspiracy or 
as part of a more narrowly defined conspiracy that focused on her 
specific agreement.173  Indeed, before the rise of “Pinkerton liability,” a 
broadly defined conspiracy was arguably favorable to defendants 
because it ensured that parties to the original agreement were not 
charged with separate conspiracy counts “every time a new party 
enters or an old one withdraws.”174  Thus, when defendants objected 
to broadly defined conspiracies, they did so on the basis that “mass 
trials” of loosely connected defendants might lead to “unwarranted 
                                                          
 170. See Marie E. Siesseger, Note, Conspiracy Theory:  The Use of the Conspiracy 
Doctrine in Times of National Crises, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1177, 1189 (2004) (“The 
evidentiary implications of conspiracy have been critically important in shaping the 
current doctrine.”). 
 171. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1165–66 (“From the viewpoint of the 
substantive criminal law, the duration and scope of a conspiratorial relationship are 
not of great significance. . . . Issues of scope and duration are of practical 
significance only as they affect the resolution of procedural questions.”).  As late as 
1973, nearly twenty years after Pinkerton, this remained the case as judges generally 
did not set a defendant’s “prison term upon so abstract a basis.”  Id. 
 172. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 541 (1947) (noting that “[t]he 
charge was made pursuant to the general conspiracy statute, § 37 of the Criminal 
Code”); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 752 (1946) (explaining 
“[p]etitioners were convicted under the general conspiracy section of the Criminal 
Code”). 
 173. Indeed, to this day, culpability for a conspiracy conviction itself is not linked 
to the object or scope of the conspiracy under the general conspiracy statute.  See 
Katyal, supra note 9, at 1337 (noting that “conspiracy law employs a blunt 
punishment, such as the five-year prison term in the general federal conspiracy 
statute, instead of always calibrating punishment to the object of the illegal 
agreement”).  Of course, this is changing as a number of federal conspiracy statutes 
now calibrate culpability to the scope of the conspiracy.  See infra notes 209–214 and 
accompanying text (discussing drug sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), which 
provides that a defendant is “subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the 
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy”). 
 174. See Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 928 (“[T]he courts seem to be using 
the word conspiracy to refer not to a crime, which by definition must be an act, but 
rather to a group,” and noting that, though defining a conspiracy with respect to a 
group rather than each individual’s agreement is logically unsound, “[t]he effects 
which follow from the use of the word in that sense are not always harmful”); see also  
United States v. Braverman, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (reversing convictions on seven 
counts of conspiracy because “[t]he one agreement cannot be taken to be several 
agreements”). 
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imputation of guilt from others’ conduct” and unfair application of 
the relaxed hearsay and venue rules in conspiracy law.175 
It was in this setting that the Supreme Court held that a defendant 
could be convicted of participating in a single conspiracy so long as 
he knew “the essential nature of the plan and [his] connections with 
it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the 
participation of others.”176  Under this practical evidentiary-based 
model, courts generally focus on qualities and characteristics of the 
group as a whole in determining a conspiracy’s scope, such as the 
nature of the criminal activity, the number of defendants, and the 
extent to which the alleged co-conspirators’ activity was 
interdependent.177  The question of whether a particular defendant 
was a member of the “conspiracy” is addressed only after the 
conspiratorial group has been thusly defined.  On this point, courts 
ask only whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became 
part of the group, but do not require that the defendant knew of or 
agreed to each of the group’s aims.178  An individual is guilty of 
joining a conspiracy so long as she “knew at least [its] essential 
objectives” and “knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it”179—“a 
person does not need to know or participate in every detail of the 
conspiracy, or to know all the conspiracy’s members.”180  As a result, 
the scope of each defendant’s agreement or participation can 
become only minimally relevant to her ultimate liability if the scope 
determination is used for more than procedural or practical 
purposes. 
The rise of “Pinkerton liability” has dramatically changed the effect 
of loosely defining the scope of a conspiracy.181  Before Pinkerton, the 
                                                          
 175. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776–77; see Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 559 (“The danger 
rested . . . in the risk that the jury, in disregard of the court’s direction, would 
transfer, consciously or unconsciously, the effect of the excluded admissions [from 
two defendants] to the other three defendants.”). 
 176. Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 557; see id. at 558 (“By their separate agreements, if 
such they were, they became parties to the larger common plan, joined together by 
their knowledge of its essential features and broad scope, though not of its exact 
limits, and by their common single goal.”). 
 177. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 483; see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 
663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting the issue of interdependence). 
 178. See United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[O]nce it 
has been shown that a conspiracy exists, the evidence need only establish a slight 
connection between the defendant and the conspiracy to support conviction.”). 
 179. United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 180. United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1080 (7th Cir. 1990); see United States 
v. Byerley, 999 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1993) (“As long as the conspiracy continues 
and its goal is to achieve a common objective, it is sufficient that a party have reason 
to know that others were involved in the conspiracy.”). 
 181. Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 929 (“When, however, additional 
criminal liability will be imposed by holding a defendant to be a member of the 
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scope definition primarily impacted issues like application of the co-
conspirator hearsay exception and satisfaction of the overt act 
requirement.182  Accordingly, the central constraint on how broadly to 
define a conspiracy was whether a broad definition, in combination 
with the use of these doctrines, prejudiced the defendant by failing to 
guard against “[t]he dangers of transference of guilt from one to 
another across the line separating conspiracies.”183  By contrast, in 
combination with vicarious liability under Pinkerton, a broadly defined 
conspiracy has the potential to significantly increase a defendant’s 
substantive criminal liability.  Nevertheless, most courts continue to 
treat the issue of scope as an evidentiary issue184 and find that “a 
defendant may be convicted of conspiracy with little or no knowledge 
of the entire breadth of the criminal enterprise . . . .”185  By broadly 
defining a single conspiracy, one court went so far as to hold, for 
example, that a defendant could be vicariously liable for substantive 
crimes that were committed before he even joined the conspiracy, so 
long as they were reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy as a whole.186  Even courts that employ a relatively measured 
approach to defining the scope of a conspiracy continue to hold that 
a defendant does not need to know the “full extent of the conspiracy” 
                                                          
‘same’ conspiracy, it seems that courts should be careful to use the word to refer to 
the crime of conspiracy rather than the [conspiratorial] group.”). 
 182. See id. at 928–29 (discussing effect of focusing on the conspiratorial group 
rather than each conspirator’s agreement). 
 183. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946); see id. at 752 (“The only 
question is whether petitioners have suffered substantial prejudice from being 
convicted of a single general conspiracy by evidence which the Government admits 
proved not one conspiracy but some eight or more different ones of the same sort 
executed through a common key figure, Simon Brown.”); Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 82 (1933) (“The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a 
variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to ‘affect the 
substantial rights’ of the accused.”). 
 184. See, e.g., United States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890, 900 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The 
existence of separate conspiracies is a question of fact, not of law, to be determined 
by the jury.”). 
 185. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2nd Cir. 1991) 
(holding that defendant can be held liable for drug weight in a conspiracy based on 
the prior acts of co-conspirators if he “knew or reasonably should have known” of the 
acts when he joined the conspiracy).  But see United States v. Carrascal-Olivera, 755 
F.2d 1446, 1452 n.8 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The courts’ refusal to extend Pinkerton liability 
for substantive criminal acts to co-conspirators who were not part of the conspiracy 
when the crime was completed may stem from due process concerns about vicarious 
guilt in attenuated circumstances.”); Robert R. Arreola et al., Federal Criminal 
Conspiracy, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 617, 628–29 (1997) (“In establishing liability for the 
conspiracy charge, the circuit courts generally find conspirator liability for acts 
committed by co-conspirators both prior to, as well as during the defendant’s 
participation.  However, a defendant cannot be held criminally liable for substantive 
offenses committed by others involved in the conspiracy before joining it or after 
ending participation in the conspiracy.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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and that “a general awareness” of the scope and object of the 
conspiracy is sufficient “to be regarded as a co-conspirator.”187  Many 
courts and commentators have pointed to the interplay between the 
scope of a conspiracy and vicarious liability in criticizing Pinkerton.188  
The drafters of the Model Penal Code cited this concern as one of 
their primary reasons for rejecting the Pinkerton doctrine.189  While 
the application of Pinkerton to a broadly defined conspiracy is no 
doubt problematic and has the potential to lead to nearly unlimited 
vicarious liability in extreme circumstances,190 critics and courts alike 
have taken as a given that the scope of the conspiracy determination 
is the same for purposes of applying Pinkerton as it is for the 
evidentiary and practical trial issues that shaped the scope doctrine.191 
If Pinkerton’s two-part test is a constitutionally based limit, however, 
then it would seem to require courts to take significantly more care in 
defining the scope of a conspiracy.  Basing vicarious liability on the 
scope of the conspiracy as a whole is at odds with the constitutional 
view of Pinkerton because it eliminates the relationship between the 
defendant’s acts or agreement and the third party’s substantive 
offense from the analytical equation.  By focusing on the “scope” of 
the conspiracy overall, a defendant may be held liable for substantive 
offenses he could not have reasonably foreseen and that were not 
done in furtherance of his agreement based entirely on the size of 
the amorphous “scope” of the conspiracy.  In these circumstances, a 
defendant’s liability for other’s acts will depend on an ex-post 
characterization of the group he joined, rather than whether his 
                                                          
 187. United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 669–70 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations 
omitted); see id. at 674 (“[W]e must be particularly vigilant when the government 
seeks to bring many individuals under the umbrella of a single conspiracy.”). 
 188. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 10, at 635 (“The Pinkerton doctrine has been 
used to hold an actor liable for a series of abortions performed without her 
knowledge by a doctor to whom she had on other occasions referred women for 
abortions.”); see also United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67–68 n.3 (D. Mass. 
2003) (“Yet one must wonder where the outer limits of accomplice liability [under 
Pinkerton] lie.  If a person merely had loaned the robbers a ski mask that was then 
used in the robbery, could he or she likewise be held responsible for murder?”). 
 189. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 307 (1985) (stating the law “lose[s] all 
sense of just proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each [conspirator 
is] held accountable for thousands of additional offenses of which he was completely 
unaware and which he did not influence at all”). 
 190. See, e.g., Siesseger, supra note 170, at 1204 (noting that, in the context of a 
post-9/11 terrorism case, the government “broadly characterized” a conspiracy as “al 
Qaeda’s conspiracy to attack the United States”) (quotations and citations omitted).  
For an insightful and illuminating analysis of some of the problems posed by broadly 
defined scope in terrorism prosecutions see Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? 
Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 
469–74 (2007) (discussing prosecutions defining the scope of a conspiracy as the 
global jihad movement). 
 191. See supra Part I (discussing the rise of the two-part Pinkerton test). 
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conduct or agreement was actually linked to those additional 
crimes.192  If the due process view of Pinkerton is meant to protect 
personal guilt, rather than set arbitrary limits tied to a court’s 
evidentiary characterization of the breadth of a conspiracy, the 
current, imprecise approach to scope is terribly problematic. 
The well-known case Anderson v. Superior Court,193 frequently cited by 
Pinkerton critics as an example of how a broad application of the 
doctrine can result in potentially unbounded vicarious liability,194 
helps illustrate how basing vicarious liability on the scope of the 
conspiracy, rather than the defendant’s conduct, is inconsistent with 
Pinkerton as a due process limit.  The defendant in Anderson referred 
pregnant women who were seeking an abortion to a doctor in 
exchange for a fee for each woman on whom he performed the 
procedure.195  The doctor had a similar arrangement with sixteen 
other individuals and all were jointly indicted for conspiracy as well 
as, vicariously, for every abortion performed by the doctor.196  
Anderson challenged her indictment on the ground that each 
agreement between the doctor and the referring party was a separate 
conspiracy.197  The court rejected this claim and held that there was a 
single conspiracy, likening it to a business with a “common design” in 
which each party plays a role in an ongoing enterprise.198  
Accordingly, it found that Anderson could be held vicariously liable 
for all of the abortions performed in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
including abortions based on referrals by other defendants in which 
she played no part.199 
The result in Anderson demonstrates how applying Pinkerton based 
on a court’s definition of a conspiracy, rather than each defendant’s 
individual agreement or actions, can divorce liability from personal 
guilt.  First, though the defendant may have been able to foresee that 
                                                          
 192. See supra Part III (discussing the personal guilt requirement that there be a 
substantial relationship between a defendant’s conduct or agreement and the third 
parties substantive crimes). 
 193. 177 P.2d 315 (1947) (limiting vicarious liability for the substantive offenses of 
co-conspirators to crimes committed after the defendant joined the conspiracy), 
overruled in part by People v. Weiss, 327 P.2d 527, 545 (1958). 
 194. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 10, at 1147 (criticizing Anderson as an example of 
“the tendency of courts to regard a conspiracy as an ongoing business relationship of 
indefinite scope and duration” in applying vicarious liability in a conspiracy); 
Robinson, supra note 10, at 635 (describing the case as one “where the defendants’ 
causal connection to the harm is tenuous at best”). 
 195. Anderson, 177 P.2d at 315–16. 
 196. Id. at 315. 
 197. Id. at 316. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 316–17. 
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the doctor was performing other abortions in general,200 there is no 
indication she could have foreseen the extent of his business or any 
particular abortion apart from the ones that resulted from her 
referrals.  By holding her liable for all of the doctor’s abortions based 
on the scope of the “conspiracy” defined from the perspective of its 
ringleader, the doctor, the court in effect made the defendant strictly 
liable for the size of the operation without regard to what may have 
been foreseeable to her.  If Pinkerton is a constitutional floor based on 
personal guilt, however, the inquiry must focus on what was 
reasonably foreseeable to each defendant.  Similarly, and perhaps 
more importantly in this case, the defendant’s actions did not have a 
causal relationship with any of the abortions that resulted from 
referrals by other women.201  Those abortions may have furthered the 
broadly defined “conspiracy” from the perspective of the doctor, but 
had at most a “tenuous,” circumstantial relationship with the 
defendant’s agreement and conduct.202  Anderson did not directly 
benefit from, or contribute to, the abortions resulting from referrals 
to the doctor by other women.  Her only connection to them was her 
association with the doctor in general, but personal guilt requires a 
substantial relationship between her agreement and the substantive 
offense. 
In short, as the drafters of the Model Penal Code observed, 
applying the Pinkerton test to a broadly defined conspiracy, without 
regard to each defendant’s knowledge of the breadth of the 
conspiracy, separates vicarious liability from a defendant’s culpability 
and makes him strictly liable for potentially “thousands of additional 
offenses of which he was completely unaware and which he did not 
influence at all.”203  Unless vicarious liability under Pinkerton is limited 
to substantive offenses that were reasonably foreseeable and in 
furtherance of each defendant’s conspiratorial agreement or 
                                                          
 200. See id. at 317 (“The inference is almost compelled, if the evidence is believed, 
that this petitioner knew that Stern was engaged in the commission of abortions not 
casually but as a regular business and that others, like herself, had conspired with 
him to further his operations.”). 
 201. See supra Part III (discussing causal relationship). 
 202. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226 (1961) (“[T]he enquiry here must 
direct itself to an analysis of the relationship between the fact of membership and the 
underlying substantive illegal conduct, in order to determine whether that 
relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its use as the basis of criminal liability.”).  
This is not to say that the abortions were entirely unrelated as, arguably, by 
participating in the conspiracy, the defendant helped sustain the doctor’s business, 
which in turn helped make the other abortions possible, but this attenuated 
relationship is far from the substantial relationship between the substantive crime 
and the defendant’s conduct necessary to satisfy personal guilt under Scales. 
 203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 307 (1985). 
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participation, the evidentiary and practical inquiry into the scope of 
the conspiracy will improperly dictate substantive liability.  This result 
is far from the narrow category of vicarious liability at issue in 
Pinkerton, where the substantive offenses were the actual object of the 
defendant’s conspiratorial agreement.204  More importantly, it is 
incompatible with the practice of treating Pinkerton as a due process 
floor based in personal guilt.  It would be meaningless to speak of 
Pinkerton as a constitutionally based rule if vicarious liability under its 
test depends on a court’s arbitrary definition of a “conspiracy” from 
its ringleader’s view rather than the defendant’s agreement.  Indeed, 
the notion of Pinkerton as a due process-based test only makes sense if 
it focuses on the relationship between the defendant’s actual 
agreement or conduct and the substantive offense. 
One might argue that a broadly defined conspiracy still ensures 
there is a minimum link between the defendant and each substantive 
offense in as much as each offense was reasonably foreseeable and in 
furtherance of the broader conspiracy of which the defendant was a 
part.  But this claim misses the mark.  Premising vicarious liability on 
the defendant’s association alone is the precise “guilt by association” 
approach that the personal guilt concept forbids.  If A’s only 
connection to C’s crimes is that she had an illegal agreement with B, 
who simultaneously had a similar illegal agreement with C, the only 
relationship between A and C’s crimes is A’s remote association with 
C.  This is not to say that because A and C never met and did not 
know of each other A could never be liable for C’s crimes.  There 
must, however, be a substantial relationship between A’s agreement 
and C’s criminal conduct in order for A to be vicariously liable, not 
merely an independently punishable association between A and B, 
who is separately linked to C. 
Though the practice of broadly defining a conspiracy is perhaps 
most problematic when it is used as the launching point for 
determining vicarious liability for additional substantive crimes, it can 
also lead to strict vicarious liability for a conspiracy charge itself 
under statutes that link liability to the scope or object of the illegal 
agreement.  As noted above, the law of determining the scope of a 
conspiracy developed at a time when, “[f]rom the viewpoint of 
substantive criminal law, the duration and scope of a conspiratorial 
relationship [were] not of great significance” and instead were 
important “only as they affect[ed] the resolution of procedural 
                                                          
 204. See supra Part I (discussing how the liability at issue in Pinkerton was much 
narrower than the doctrine as it is currently applied). 
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questions.”205  This remains largely true to this day under federal law206 
with respect to liability for the conspiracy offense itself.  The general 
federal conspiracy statute provides for a standard maximum five-year 
prison term for any offense regardless of the object or scope of the 
conspiracy, unless the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor, in 
which case the maximum term is tied to the object of the offense.207  
There are, however, a handful of key federal statutes that have 
abandoned this approach by tying a defendant’s sentence for a 
conspiracy conviction to the object of the conspiracy.208 
Perhaps the most frequently employed statute in this category is 
the drug conspiracy statute, which bases the maximum sentence for a 
conspiracy conviction on the weight of the drugs that were the object 
of the conspiracy.209  Circuit courts are currently split over the 
question of how to calculate drug weight under the conspiracy 
statute.210  The debate has recently gained renewed energy in the 
wake of cases following Apprendi v. New Jersey,211 which established that 
juries, not judges, must determine drug quantity as an element of a 
conspiracy conviction under the federal drug conspiracy statute.212  
                                                          
 205. Johnson, supra note 10, at 1165–66. 
 206. The Model Penal Code, by contrast, generally grades punishment for the 
conspiracy the same as for the object of the offense.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) 
(1985).  However, the Model Penal Code also “excludes from an agreement’s 
objectives any consequences that are not actually desired by the conspirators” and 
rejects Pinkerton liability.  Patrick A. Broderick, Conditional Objectives of Conspiracies, 94 
YALE L.J. 895, 903 (1985).  An analysis of how the constitutional dimensions of 
Pinkerton might impact the Model Penal Code’s approach to the definition of a 
conspiracy’s object is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 207. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). 
 208. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2000) (“Any person who conspires to commit 
any [money laundering] offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be 
subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of 
which was the object of the conspiracy.”); Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 
212–14 (2005) (discussing statutes that specify conspiracy liability for particular 
offenses as opposed to the general conspiracy statute). 
 209. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) (setting forth statutory maximum sentences for 
offenses based on drug weights); see also 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (providing that 
individuals convicted are “subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the 
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy”); 
United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311–12 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining the 
relationship between §§ 846 and 841). 
 210. Infra notes 213–214and accompanying text. 
 211. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 212. Id. at 490.  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490.  Before Apprendi, the 
standard practice was for the district court to determine drug quantity for purposes 
of applying 21 U.S.C. § 841 and the sentencing guidelines simultaneously.  Following 
Apprendi, however, courts have held that the jury, rather than the district court, must 
make the drug quantity determination under § 841.  E.g., United States v. Promise, 
255 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2001).  In Promise, the court stated, “Apprendi dictates that in 
order to authorize the imposition of a sentence exceeding the maximum allowable 
 
2008] VICARIOUS CRIMINAL LIABILITY 625 
Some courts hold that drug weight must be calculated based on the 
amount that was reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of each 
defendant’s agreement, consistent with the approach taken by the 
federal sentencing guidelines.213  Others, however, have found that 
the relevant quantity is the amount of drugs attributable to the 
conspiracy as a whole.214 
Courts on both sides of this issue have treated the question purely 
as a matter of statutory interpretation,215 but if Pinkerton’s test is 
rooted in due process, there may be a constitutional basis for 
calculating drug quantity for each defendant rather than the 
conspiracy as a whole.  One proponent of applying the drug 
conspiracy provision based on the scope of the entire conspiracy, 
Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit, recently argued in a dissenting 
opinion that an individualized approach would “systematically 
undermine[] the deterrent effects of the federal drug laws.”216  
Specifically, he claimed that if “the punishment relates only to the 
extent of the harm foreseeable to the individual, not the extent of the 
harm the conspiracy actually poses,” conspiratorial conduct would go 
“underpunish[ed].”217  Judge Niemeyer’s argument, however, reveals 
                                                          
without a jury finding of a specific threshold drug quantity, the specific threshold 
quantity must be treated as an element of an aggravated drug trafficking offense, i.e., 
charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 
156–57 (footnotes omitted); see also Collins, 415 F.3d at 312–14 (reassessing the 
method for calculating drug weight for purposes of § 846 in light of Apprendi). 
 213. See, e.g., Collins, 415 F.3d at 314 (finding that “the jury must determine what 
amount of cocaine base [is] attributable to [a defendant] using Pinkerton 
principles”); United States v. Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700, 704–05 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(requiring threshold drug quantity in conspiracy cases to be individualized by the 
jury using Pinkerton). 
 214. See, e.g., United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(citing Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2002), for the proposition that 
the finding of the amount of drugs for the conspiracy establishes the maximum 
sentence for the conspirators); Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 42–43 (1st Cir. 
2002) (holding that a jury should determine the quantity of drugs attributable to a 
conspiracy as a whole and then the district court should determine the amount 
attributable to each defendant in applying the sentencing guidelines). 
 215. See, e.g., United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72, 78 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[I]n order to 
apply § 841(b) properly, a district court must first apply the principles of Pinkerton as 
set forth in the relevant conduct section of the sentencing guidelines . . . to 
determine the quantity of narcotics reasonably foreseeable to each co-conspirator 
within the scope of his agreement.”). 
 216. United States v. Ferguson, No. 05-4460, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18831, at *33 
(4th Cir. Aug. 8, 2007) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 217. Id.  With respect to deterrence, Judge Niemeyer curiously argued that 
calculating drug quantity for each co-conspirator would “allow conspiracies to 
decrease their exposure by compartmentalizing their operations, segmenting 
responsibilities, and otherwise keeping members from knowing the full extent of the 
conspiracy.”  Id. at *33–34.  As Professor Katyal has noted, however, one of the chief 
utilitarian aims and benefits of conspiracy law is to “reduce[] the efficiency of 
criminal enterprises and combat[] group identity by creating incentives for members 
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exactly why basing culpability on a broadly defined conspiracy is 
problematic under the due process view of Pinkerton.  Under his 
approach, a defendant would be held strictly liable for the scope of 
the conspiracy as a whole, without regard to what was “foreseeable” to 
him or whether his actions influenced others’ conduct.  In the case of 
a completed conspiracy, this method would effectively supplant 
Pinkerton’s test for substantive drug offenses, as any drug offense 
committed by a co-conspirator would be subsumed into the 
determination of the “scope” of the conspiracy.  The impact in the 
case of an uncompleted conspiracy would be even more pernicious, 
as it would expand a defendant’s criminal liability based on nothing 
more than the mere agreements of other members in the broadly 
defined conspiracy.   
To be sure, Pinkerton’s test may be an imperfect fit when 
determining the scope of uncompleted conspiracies.218  If a drug 
conspiracy has not yet distributed any drugs, for example, it is 
difficult to say which particular acts of distribution contemplated by 
other conspirators are “reasonably foreseeable” or “in furtherance” of 
the defendant’s agreement.  However, this fact weighs in favor of 
limiting the relevant scope of the conspiracy to the defendant’s actual 
agreement, for convictions under statutes that base the severity of 
punishment on the scope determination.  As an inchoate crime, the 
“gravamen of conspiracy is [the] agreement to commit a crime or 
series of crimes”219 and it is difficult to see how a defendant can be 
said to have agreed to illegal conduct about which he was completely 
unaware (much less, conduct that he could not even have 
foreseen).220  Under traditional conspiracy statutes, which provide for 
a single maximum penalty regardless of the scope or object of the 
conspiracy, a broadly defined conspiracy may be permissible as the 
most efficient and sensible method for prosecuting the participants.  
But, where the extent of criminal liability is linked to the definition of 
the scope of the agreement, any expansion beyond each defendant’s 
                                                          
of organizations not to share information with each other.”  Katyal, supra note 9, at 
1353. 
 218. Ferguson, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18331, at *33 (“Because drug quantity must 
often be calculated on a forward-looking basis in conspiracy cases, the jury must 
evaluate that quantity based on the scope of the conspiratorial agreement and could 
not undertake the [Pinkerton] inquiry required by Collins.”). 
 219. Id. at *22. 
 220. See Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 928 (footnote omitted) (“Courts 
generally consider that a person who joins an existing criminal group becomes a 
party to the same conspiracy.  But if a conspiracy consists of the continuing act of the 
agreement, it is difficult to see how this can be so, since the act of agreement in 
which an individual participates cannot logically begin before he enters or continue 
after he leaves.”). 
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agreement would seem to improperly enlarge the agreement, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation.221  In any event, as a matter of 
personal guilt under the Due Process Clause, a defendant should at 
least be able to reasonably foresee the extent of that to which he is 
agreeing. 
In sum, imposing additional criminal liability by reference to the 
broadly defined scope of a conspiracy relates to the same concerns 
under the personal guilt requirement as the Pinkerton test itself.  If 
the Due Process Clause limits vicarious liability, in accordance with 
Pinkerton, the limit only makes sense as a means of ensuring a 
minimally substantial relationship between the defendant’s conduct 
and the conduct of others.  But if individuals can be held liable for 
crimes and acts that they did not foresee and did not influence, based 
entirely on an abstract post-hoc definition of the conspiracy as a 
whole, liability would be divorced from personal guilt.  Indeed, it 
would be strange to speak of a “due process” limit that constrained 
liability based on arbitrary factors, like a court’s determination of how 
broadly evidentiary and practical considerations permit a conspiracy 
to be defined.  Thus, if Pinkerton’s test is indeed a constitutional 
minimum, it would only seem to be a coherent one if it similarly 
limits the definition of the scope of a conspiracy in instances where 
the determination will lead to additional criminal liability.  To ensure 
a substantial relationship between the defendant’s conduct and his 
co-conspirator’s actions, courts should require a particularized 
determination of the scope of each defendant’s agreement and 
participation in any situation where additional criminal liability is 
imposed on a defendant based on the “scope” definition. 
B. Felony Murder 
Perhaps the area of law that first comes to mind as potentially 
inconsistent with Pinkerton’s test as a due process minimum for 
vicarious liability is the felony murder rule.  The parallels between 
the two doctrines are especially strong when the felony murder rule is 
employed based on another person’s acts (whether a co-felon’s or 
                                                          
 221. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975).  Indeed, Feola indicates that this 
result is required where the scope or object of the conspiracy might affect a 
defendant’s substantive liability.  Id. at 695.  The Court explained that “the 
knowledge of the parties is relevant to the same issues and to the same extent as it 
may be for conviction of the substantive offense.”  Id.  The Court also stated that its 
“decisions establish that in order to sustain a judgment of conviction on a charge of 
conspiracy to violate a federal statute, the Government must prove at least the degree 
of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself.”  Id. at 686. 
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those of a person unaffiliated with the felony).222  Under the classic 
formulation, the felony murder doctrine began as a harsh common 
law rule that “declare[d] that one is guilty of murder if death results 
from conduct during the commission or attempted commission of 
any felony” and thus “operated to impose liability for murder based 
on . . . strict liability.”223  Recently, in a persuasive and exhaustively 
researched article, Professor Guyora Binder argued that the “harsh 
‘common law’ felony murder rule” premised on strict liability is “a 
myth”224 and that “the felony murder rule eventually adopted in 
England was at least as mild as the ‘reformed’ law of felony murder 
prevailing in contemporary America.”225  Indeed, Professor Binder’s 
research indicates that the English common law and early American 
approach was likely more protective of linking murder liability to each 
individual’s culpability than the current approach.226  In any event, 
today, most modern felony murder statutes limit liability to deaths 
                                                          
 222.  
A defendant may be convicted of felony murder for a death caused by 
himself or another when the death occurs during the commission of one of a 
number of specified felonies, even if neither the defendant nor his 
confederate had any intent to kill.  Under the Pinkerton doctrine, however, a 
defendant may not be convicted of murder unless one of his criminal 
associates, acting foreseeably and in furtherance of the conspiracy, caused 
the victim’s death with the intent to do so. 
State v. Diaz, 679 A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1996).  Robinson discusses similar theoretical 
justifications for Pinkerton and felony murder accomplice liability.  Robinson, supra 
note 10, at 665–68.  For an example of liability under the felony murder doctrine for 
the acts of someone who was not a co-felon, see People v. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d 582 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1973).  Hickman held that defendants could be held liable under the 
felony murder rule where they attempted to burglarize a liquor warehouse after 
hours, fled after being seen by the police, and during the ensuing foot-chase one 
police officer shot and killed another police officer after mistaking the officer for 
one of the defendants.  Id. at 583, 586. 
 223. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 30–31 (1980); see also People v. 
Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (“The doctrine is not limited to 
those deaths which are foreseeable.  Rather a felon is held strictly liable for all 
killings committed by him or his accomplices in the course of the felony.”) (citations 
omitted); Pauley, supra note 11, at 37 (“It is, of course, true that, in its strict common-
law form, felony murder is based on strict liability, not on negligence.”).  See generally 
Binder, supra note 3, at 60–62 (describing the traditional account of the felony 
murder doctrine). 
 224. Binder, supra note 3, at 63. 
 225. Id. at 64. 
 226. Compare id. (“Prior to the American Revolution, English courts had gone no 
further than to impose murder liability on persons who (1) mistakenly killed one 
person in an attempt to kill or wound another; (2) killed while defending themselves 
against resistance to a crime; or (3) agreed with others to kill or wound for a criminal 
purpose, one of whom then killed for that purpose.”), and id. at 65-66 (noting that 
early American courts “usually required that felons kill their victims by intentionally 
battering them or by engaging in some destructive act manifestly dangerous to life, 
such as deliberately wrecking a train”), with Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 603 (explaining 
that the felony murder rule is a strict liability rule and it does not matter whether 
“the death was a natural or probable consequence” of the felony). 
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that result from the commission of an enumerated felony or an 
inherently dangerous felony; many others restrict the doctrine to 
deaths that result from the act of a co-felon.227  Within these 
restrictions, however, courts generally hold that the rule applies to 
completely accidental deaths and thus “authorizes strict liability for a 
death that results from commission of a felony.”228  Accordingly, 
felony murder, as applied in many states, may permit liability that is 
inconsistent with the due process concept of personal guilt. 
In the California case People v. Fuller,229 for example, an officer 
observed two men in the lot of a car dealership rolling two tires 
apiece toward a Plymouth early on a Sunday morning.230  As the 
officer drove past the Plymouth, the men got inside and quickly took 
off.231  A high-speed chase ensued, which ended when the Plymouth 
ran a red light and collided with another vehicle, killing its driver.232  
An investigation revealed that the men had forcibly entered four 
locked Dodge vans at the car lot and removed the spare tires from 
each.233  They were both charged with burglary and felony murder.234  
Burglary was an enumerated felony under California’s first degree 
felony murder statute, but the defendants argued that the law should 
not apply in the case of flight from a burglary that was not itself 
dangerous.235  The court held that the plain language of the statute 
permitted prosecution of the both defendants for first degree felony 
murder.236  However, the court went on to discuss what it called “the 
irrationality of applying the felony murder rule in the present case.”237  
The court explained that applying the felony murder rule for all 
deaths occurring during a set of enumerated crimes was too broad 
and encompassed felonies, like the one in Fuller, that were not 
actually dangerous.238  As the court noted, the defendants committed 
                                                          
 227. See, e.g., State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 23, 30 (N.J. 1977) (citing supporting 
cases and agreeing that felony murder “does not extend to a killing, although 
growing out of the commission of the felony, if directly attributable to the act of one 
other than the defendant or those associated with him in the unlawful enterprise”).  
But see Hickman, 297 N.E.2d at 586 (holding that defendants could be held liable 
under felony murder rule where the killing was by a police officer who shot and 
killed another police officer after mistaking the officer for one of the defendants). 
 228. DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 557. 
 229. 150 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 230. Id. at 516. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id.  
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 517.  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 518. 
 238. Id. at 518–20. 
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the burglary unarmed, on a Sunday morning when the dealership was 
closed, and there was no sign they expected to use violence during 
the crime.239  In other words, the death was hardly a foreseeable result 
of the defendants’ planned burglary.240 
Though the Fuller court did not address the issue of vicarious 
liability, its decision is particularly problematic for the co-felon who 
was not driving the vehicle.  The driver of the car was recklessly 
driving the Plymouth when he collided with the oncoming car and 
killed its driver, but his co-felon could have been prosecuted under 
the felony murder rule even if he had not been involved in the 
getaway.241  This point was highlighted in a subsequent California 
case, People v. Thongvilay,242 where, on similar facts, two defendants 
were convicted of felony murder.243  The defendants argued that the 
death did not occur during the commission of the burglary because 
the car chase took place after they had already left the scene and 
reached a place of relative safety.244  The majority rejected this claim 
and upheld the defendants’ conviction.245  However, a dissenting 
judge observed the particularly troublesome impact of applying the 
felony murder rule to the non-driver co-felon.  “The [State], 
however,” the judge explained, 
chose to prosecute this case only on a first-degree felony murder 
theory, presumably because that was the only homicide theory that 
would also include the passenger . . . . Because he had no control 
over the car in which he was riding as a passenger, to hold [him] 
responsible for first-degree felony murder based on his 
                                                          
 239. Id. at 519. 
 240. Id. at 519–20 (observing that “treating the flight as part of the burglary to 
bootstrap the entire transaction into one inherently dangerous to human life simply 
begs the issue; flight from the scene of any crime is inherently dangerous”). 
 241. Id. at 520–21 (noting in dicta that the defendants could be prosecuted for 
second degree murder).  Though the Fuller court did not differentiate the driver and 
passenger in its discussion of the second degree murder issue—likely because the 
defendants did not raise any argument with respect to second degree murder—the 
passenger could not have been prosecuted individually for second degree murder.  
See People v. Thongvilay, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 242. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738. 
 243. Id. at 741.  In Thongvilay, the two defendants stole a car radio and were 
pursued by the boyfriend of the owner of the burglarized car.  The defendants drove 
through a red light attempting to elude the boyfriend and ran into another car, 
killing its driver.  Id. 
 244. Id. at 750 (McKinster, J., dissenting) (explaining that although only a few 
minutes separated the defendants from the commission of the burglary and the 
chase by the boyfriend, it was sufficient to sever the burglary from the car crash). 
 245. Id. at 743 (majority opinion). 
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participation in a felony that is not inherently dangerous is a 
manifest injustice.246 
Fuller and Thongvilay demonstrate the potential, even under 
prevailing constraints on the felony murder rule, for a co-felon to be 
held vicariously liable for a death that was not reasonably foreseeable 
to him.  If Pinkerton’s test is the constitutional minimum for vicarious 
liability in a conspiracy, it is difficult to see why it should not also 
require reasonable foreseeability for vicarious felony murder liability.  
One might argue that the felony murder doctrine is inherently more 
constrained than Pinkerton because a felony is usually more limited in 
duration and number of participants than a conspiracy.  While this 
fact undoubtedly accounts for the relatively small number of 
instances where felony murder is imposed for a killing that was not 
foreseeable, it does not ensure a connection between the personal 
guilt of each felon and the resulting death in every case.  The 
Pinkerton test and Scales’ personal guilt requirement are concerned 
with constraining the relationship between the individual’s actions 
and the wrongful act with which they are vicariously charged.  The 
smaller number of participants and shorter time period in a felony 
may limit the reach of felony murder overall, but these limits, like the 
enumerated felony limitation, are ultimately arbitrary from the 
perspective of personal guilt.  They do not prevent accomplices from 
being held strictly liable for accidental and unforeseeable deaths that 
were caused by others in all instances. 
A related and more persuasive argument is that what felony 
murder lacks in the way of limits based on foreseeability, it makes up 
for in the area of causation.  The felony murder rule generally 
requires a causal relationship between the felony and resulting 
death.247  For example, in King v. Commonwealth,248 King and his 
accomplice, Bailey, were flying an airplane containing over 500 
pounds of marijuana through thick fog when the plane crashed into 
a mountain, killing Bailey.249  King was convicted of felony murder for 
Bailey’s death but the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed, finding 
that the death had not been caused by the felony.250  Though the 
court acknowledged that King and Bailey were only flying the 
                                                          
 246. See id. at 752 (McKinster, J., dissenting); see also id. (noting that “[a]s to [the 
driver], the evidence might support a second degree murder conviction on an 
implied malice theory and clearly supports a vehicular manslaughter charge”). 
 247. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 567 (“There must also be a causal relationship 
between the felony and the homicide.”). 
 248. 368 S.E.2d 704 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). 
 249. Id. at 705. 
 250. Id. 
 
632 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:585 
airplane as part of their felonious activity, it found that the accident 
itself “stemmed not from the possession or distribution of drugs, but 
from fog, low cloud cover, pilot error, and inexperience.”251  Unlike 
cases involving accidental deaths during flight from a felony, there 
was no indication that King and Bailey were flying recklessly to avoid 
detection and, accordingly, the causation requirement was not 
satisfied.252  It is worth noting that this causal requirement is analyzed 
based on the felony generally rather than each felon’s participation, 
and that rules like the flight doctrine expand the causal reach beyond 
the felony itself.253  Still, even in flight cases, the causation 
requirement in felony murder seems at least as robust as Pinkerton’s 
“in furtherance of” requirement in limiting liability.  In Fuller, for 
example, the reckless getaway was the direct result of the burglary 
and certainly furthered the pair’s efforts to complete the crime 
without being caught.254  To be sure, the death may have occurred 
even without the passenger’s participation in the felony, but the same 
is true of vicarious liability under Pinkerton and Scales.  Personal guilt 
under Scales does not require but-for causation; so long as the 
defendant influenced or attempted to influence the crime, the 
“causal” relationship between the defendant and the third party’s 
crime will be satisfied. 
Though the “causal” link in felony murder seems at least as strong 
as under Pinkerton, it is unlikely that this fact alone could save broad 
applications of felony murder under the view that Pinkerton’s 
vicarious liability limits are rooted in due process.  As discussed 
above, most courts that have held the Pinkerton test to be a 
constitutional floor have focused on the foreseeability prong.  As the 
Sixth Circuit put it, “[t]he foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton 
is also the main concern underlying a possible due process 
violation.”255  The effect is to forbid liability where a third party 
unilaterally takes unusual measures to “further” the group’s goals.  
This result makes sense from the perspective of personal guilt.  
Without this limit, vicarious liability would depend on a co-felon or 
co-conspirator’s quirky behavior rather than a relationship to the 
defendant’s own wrongful conduct and state of mind.  Accordingly, 
                                                          
 251. Id. at 707–08. 
 252. Id. (“Had the plane been flying low or recklessly to avoid detection, for 
example, the crash would be a consequence or action which was directly intended to 
further the felony and a different result might obtain.”). 
 253. C.f. People v. Fuller, 150 Cal. Rptr. 515, 519–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) 
(“[F]light from the scene of any crime is inherently dangerous.”). 
 254. Id. at 516, 521. 
 255. United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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though in most felony murder cases there may be a sufficient 
relationship between each felon’s personal guilt and the resulting 
death, the relatively small number of vicarious felony murder 
convictions that are based on strict liability and involve purely 
accidental unforeseeable deaths256 seem irreconcilable with Pinkerton’s 
due process limits. 
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that vicarious liability for 
unforeseeable deaths under the felony murder doctrine is 
unconstitutional.  One might argue that a conflict between Pinkerton 
liability and felony murder only indicates that it is erroneous for 
courts to treat the Pinkerton test as a due process floor for vicarious 
liability.  After all, felony murder has been around much longer than 
Pinkerton and, under the traditional account of the felony murder 
rule, it is said to been have applied even more broadly at common 
law.  While this Article leaves for another day the question of what 
limits, if any, on vicarious criminal liability are deeply rooted in this 
nation’s history and traditions,257 it is worth noting that Professor 
Binder’s revisionist account of the felony murder rule indicates its 
application to accomplices at common law and in early American law 
was as constrained, if not more, than Pinkerton liability.  His review of 
nineteenth century American cases where vicarious liability was 
imposed under the felony murder rule revealed that all but one case 
involved instances where either “(1) some cofelons participate[d] in 
a violent assault but [did] not all strike a fatal blow; [or] (2) some 
cofelons participate[d] in a felony necessarily involving violence or 
the imposition of risk [of death], but [did] not personally participate 
in the fatal violence.”258  In other words, early American courts 
generally limited felony murder liability for accomplices to those 
“participating in felonies foreseeably involving acts of violence that 
resulted in death.”259  Thus, though the argument that the 
                                                          
 256. See, e.g., Hickman v. Commonwealth, 398 S.E.2d 698, 699 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) 
(upholding a defendant’s felony murder conviction for an accidental death based on 
the felony of aiding and abetting cocaine possession by placing cocaine onto a 
mirror). 
 257. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (plurality opinion) (noting 
that a state’s ability to carry out and define crimes “is not subject to proscription 
under the Due Process Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 258. Binder, supra note 3, at 199–200; see id. at 200 (noting all but one case fell 
into one of these two categories). 
 259. Id. at 201.  The common law approach to vicarious liability for felony murder 
appeared to be even more limited.  According to Binder, one early English case that 
found vicarious murder liability was limited by requirements that 
(1) the abettor must know of the malicious design of the party killing, 
(2) the killing must be in pursuance of that unlawful act, and not collateral 
 
634 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:585 
Constitution permits broader vicarious liability may ultimately carry 
the day, the early history of the felony murder rule does not appear 
to undercut the courts that have held that Pinkerton’s limits are 
required by due process.260 
C. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
An understanding of the constitutional dimensions of Pinkerton also 
sheds new light on the most recent line of cases to draw directly upon 
the due process personal guilt requirement.  A provision of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) makes it a 
crime to knowingly provide “material support” to a designated 
“foreign terrorist organization.”261  A person convicted of violating the 
provision is subject to a maximum sentence of fifteen years, but the 
penalty is raised to a maximum life term “if the death of any person 
results.”262  Though the law has been in effect since 1996, before 
September 11, 2001, the government only brought a handful of 
charges under it.263  Since then, the government has aggressively 
employed the law and included an AEDPA “material support” charge 
in “virtually every criminal ‘terrorism’ case that [it] has filed.”264  
Critics of the provision have argued that it is unconstitutional in a 
                                                          
to it, (3) the unlawful act ought to be deliberate, and (4) it ought to be such 
an act as may tend to the hurt of another either, immediately, or by 
necessary consequence. 
Id. at 88–89. (quotations and citations omitted).  Binder also discusses how early 
felony murder cases “conditioned its application on some form of culpability,” such 
as a requirement that each defendant actually participate in a foreseeably dangerous 
act.  Id. at 101–04. 
 260. See Sayre, supra note 55, at 697 (arguing that early common law “narrowly . . . 
restricted criminal liability within the scope of the express command or procurement 
of the accessory”). 
 261. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).  Material support is defined under § 2339A(b)(1) 
as 
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). 
 262. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
 263. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario:  Terrorism Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 18–29 (2005) (noting that only six 
people have been prosecuted for material support of terrorism between April 1996 
and September 2001). 
 264. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism:  Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003); see also Norman Abrams, The Material Support 
Terrorism Offenses:  Perspectives Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 5–6 (2005) (noting that the provision has “been frequently 
charged in prosecutions since September 11, 2001, becoming key elements in the 
government’s anti-terrorism efforts”). 
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number of respects, including that it violates the substantive due 
process personal guilt requirement.265  Courts and commentators that 
have addressed the personal guilt issue have focused on the level of 
mens rea that should be required regarding the aims of the 
organization as a whole, without separately addressing the “if death 
results” section of the statute.266  Although some courts have pointed 
to that part of the statute as a particular area of concern, they have 
assumed that the only personal guilt question presented by the law 
concerns the relationship between the defendant’s material support 
and the general nature of the organization.  Looking at AEDPA’s 
material support provision through the lens of the Pinkerton limits, 
however, indicates that the “if death results” part of the statute poses 
distinct vicarious liability due process problems.  Isolating this issue 
may help alleviate some of the confusion surrounding the material 
support provision’s constitutionality under the Due Process Clause. 
The debate over the “material support” provision and personal 
guilt has revolved around the level of knowledge or intent an 
individual should be required to possess with respect to the illegal 
aims of the designated foreign terrorist organization.  Originally, the 
government argued that the statute required only that an individual 
know the identity of the organization she was contributing to, and 
would permit strict liability if the organization was engaged in 
terrorist activities or was officially designated as a terrorist group.267  
Under this approach, the government could 
convict an individual who gives money to a designated organization 
that solicits money at their doorstep so long as the organization 
identifies itself by name.  It [would be] no defense, according to 
the government, that the organization describes to the donor only 
its humanitarian work to provide basic services to support victims 
displaced and orphaned by conflict, or to defend the cultural and 
linguistic rights of ethnic minorities.268 
                                                          
 265. See David Henrik Pendle, Comment, Charity of the Heart and Sword:  The 
Material Support Offense and Personnel Guilt, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2007) 
(noting that other arguments have included that the law is vague, overbroad, and 
infringes on the right of freedom of association).  For an analysis of the potential 
First Amendment issues implicated by the provision, see Cole, supra note 20, at 246–
50. 
 266. See generally Pendle, supra note 265, at 793–807 (analyzing the “material 
support” provision and arguing that the statute should be amended to a recklessness 
standard in light of the due process concerns under Scales). 
 267. See id. at 784–85 (describing the three competing interpretations of the 
statute); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Mens Rea for the Crime of Providing Material 
Resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 861, 872–74 (2004) 
(describing the government’s position). 
 268. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 397 (9th Cir. 
2003), vacated, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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In December 2004, Congress amended the law to clarify that “[t]o 
violate [the material support law] a person must have knowledge that 
the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . ., that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . ., or that 
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.”269  Opponents 
of the law argue, however, that knowledge is insufficient to meet the 
personal guilt requirement and that, as was done in Scales, courts 
should interpret the provision to include a “specific intent to further 
the terrorist activities of foreign terrorist organizations.”270  On this 
view, because many designated organizations engage in both illegal 
and legal activity (such as providing humanitarian aid), a specific 
intent requirement is necessary to ensure that individuals are not 
punished on the basis of their association with, and support of, the 
legal and protected aims of a designated organization.271 
Though Scales appears to provide strong support for the critics’ 
view, only one court has adopted the position that personal guilt 
requires specific intent under AEDPA’s material support law.  In 
United States v. Al-Arian,272 the Middle District of Florida considered a 
challenge to the law by alleged members of the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ).273  The defendants were alleged to have engaged in 
fundraising efforts in the United States on behalf of the PIJ, a 
designated terrorist organization that uses violence and threats of 
violence to pressure Israel to cede territory to the Palestinian 
people.274  The court pointed to the potential severity of the “if death 
results”275 provision as one of the main reasons for adopting the 
specific intent approach.276  Under a knowledge standard, an 
                                                          
 269. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000); see also Pendle, supra note 265, at 784–86 
(providing a history of Congress’ amendment in light of the strict liability position). 
 270. Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 
2005). 
 271. See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 376–80 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (discussing Hammoud’s and the government’s arguments 
and finding a need for a specific intent requirement); United States v. Al-Arian, 329 
F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (concluding that a specific intent 
requirement is necessary to satisfy due process concerns); Jonakait, supra note 267, at 
913–14 (discussing the consequences of not having a specific intent requirement). 
 272. 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294. 
 273. Id. at 1295 
 274. Id. at 1295. 
 275. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000). 
 276. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1300 (footnote omitted) (“[T]his Court has to 
look no further than the text of the provision to see that the severe punishments 
provided for in [the material support provision] are justified by and explicitly tied to 
the criminal activity of the FTO.  For example, [the law] provides for a sentence of 
up to life imprisonment if the provision of material support results in the death of 
any person.”).  The court also emphasized the fact that Scales required specific intent 
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individual who is a member of a designated organization, but opposes 
its illegal activity, could be held vicariously liable for another’s death 
and face life in prison if the member was a fundraiser thinking the 
money would be used solely for humanitarian or educational 
purposes.277  The court concluded that, under the law:  “A’s criminal 
liability is inextricably connected to his association with B and the 
[Foreign Terrorist Organization].  Further, the level of A’s criminal 
punishment is totally dependent on B’s, and other members of the 
FTO’s, criminal conduct.”278  Though the Ninth Circuit held that a 
knowledge standard was sufficient to satisfy Scales, it similarly pointed 
to the “if death results” term as one of the “more troubling” parts of 
the statute and noted that “[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress 
intended to impose a life sentence on a person who did not know 
that his or her support could go toward unlawful activities.”279  
Neither court, however, considered whether this troublesome part of 
the law presents distinct personal guilt issues. 
Viewing Pinkerton as a due process requirement indicates that the 
“if death results” portion of the statute presents a personal guilt 
problem distinct from the act of material support itself.  Under the 
material support provision, the relevant personal guilt question is 
what level of mens rea is required to link the defendant to the 
general illegal aims or acts of the group, in order for her conduct to 
constitute a substantive offense.280  The “if death results” part of the 
statute, however, makes a defendant who already has a punishable 
link to the group vicariously liable for others’ conduct.  The statute’s 
ambiguous wording does not clearly indicate what relationship 
between the defendant’s “material support” and the death is required 
to meet this element.  For example, the provision could arguably be 
interpreted to require a strict causal relationship, where the material 
support was a but-for cause of the death.  Alternatively, one might 
argue that all that is required is that the organization use the support 
given by the defendant to help it carry out a killing.  In either case, 
however, if the statute merely requires knowledge of the group’s 
illegal activity there appears to be a significant danger that a 
defendant could be convicted for deaths that were not reasonably 
                                                          
and referred to “conduct” in addition to membership in its discussion.  Id. at 1299–
1300. 
 277. The court employed a similar but more elaborate hypothetical.  Id. at 1300.  
 278. Id. 
 279. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 401 (9th Cir. 
2003), vacated, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 280. Abrams, supra note 264, at 8 (noting that, though the provision has certain 
characteristics of traditional complicity, it is a substantive offense). 
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foreseeable to her.  Returning to the Florida court’s example, a 
defendant who knew an organization was engaged in some illegal 
conduct, or was aware of its classification by the government as a 
terrorist organization, could be held vicariously liable for a death 
under this statute, even if he believed his support would be used only 
for humanitarian purposes.  Regardless of whether personal guilt 
requires intent or merely knowledge to criminalize when providing 
material support for an organization, it would seem to prohibit 
holding a defendant strictly and vicariously liable for others’ 
murders.  To be sure, interpreting the material support provision to 
require an intent to assist in the group’s illegal activity would likely 
cure this concern because, if a defendant intended to provide 
material support for terrorist activity, it would presumably be 
reasonably foreseeable in almost any instance that death could result.  
However, the majority of courts, which have applied the knowledge 
standard to the material support provision, should require more 
under the “if death results” element of the law.  Otherwise, a 
defendant who believed she was supporting humanitarian aims of a 
group that was also engaged in illegal conduct could be held strictly 
liable for killings that were not reasonably foreseeable to her or done 
in furtherance of her agreement or conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Vicarious liability in criminal law, from Pinkerton liability to felony 
murder, has been consistently and strongly criticized; courts and 
commentators, however, have paid surprisingly little attention to the 
question of what constraints, if any, the Constitution places on 
vicarious criminal liability.  This omission is all the more curious in 
light of the sparse but consistent line of cases that hold that 
Pinkerton’s limits constitute a due process minimum for vicarious 
liability in a conspiracy, as well as the personal guilt doctrine, which 
appears to bolster that approach.  While the personal guilt 
requirement may not adequately address all of the objections to 
vicarious liability in criminal law, it might at least eliminate some of 
the most egregious and troubling applications of vicarious liability.  
At the same time, while cases that have treated Pinkerton’s limits as 
constitutionally based help illuminate some of the key issues in 
assessing personal guilt in other vicarious liability contexts, the true 
limits and nature of personal guilt under the Constitution are far 
from clear.  It is almost certain that the Due Process Clause would 
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forbid sending A to prison for B’s crimes based entirely on the fact 
that A and B are cousins.281  However, there is no coherent framework 
for analyzing even moderately close questions in the area of vicarious 
liability and personal guilt.  This Article aims to begin addressing 
these issues by providing a thorough account of the cases that have 
held Pinkerton to be constitutionally required and asking how these 
cases might impact other vicarious liability criminal law doctrines.  
The analysis indicates that the personal guilt requirement may pose 
important challenges to vicarious criminal liability in a number of 
areas, including the current approach to defining “scope” in 
conspiracy law, broad applications of the felony murder rule, and the 
material support provision of AEDPA.  The law still has a long road to 
travel, however, to reach a consistent approach to personal guilt that 
would allow a more definitive and reliable analysis of vicarious 
criminal liability.  It is my hope that this Article will help to spark a 
dialogue about these important but under-examined questions. 
 
                                                          
 281. Cf. New Hampshire v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38, 40 (1979) (“[W]e have no 
hesitancy in holding that any attempt to impose [criminal] liability on parents simply 
because they occupy the status of parents, without more, offends the due process 
clause of our State Constitution.”). 
